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Abstract
Members of Congress must manage both their representative and legislative re-
sponsibilities. As congressional districts have grown in population, how have these
o ces handled the increase in communications volume that has accompanied the twin
challenges of population growth and communications access? As communications
have gotten less costly, has this changed the population of those making contact with
their elected o cials? What e↵ect does this communication have on how constituents
approve of their member of Congress? And finally, how do members of Congress use
the resources allocated to them to communicate with their constituents?
Essay 1 examines this issue from the point of view of the constituent. Using data
from the Cooperative Congressional Election Studies 2006-2008, it examines patterns
of contact, including reasons for and means of contact. Reported contact with mem-
bers of Congress has increased, mirroring data from Congress about their increased
communications volume. The majority of this communication is oriented towards ex-
pressing positions on issues, and most of that communication is conducted via e-mail.
Finally, while most constituents who make contact are satisfied with the results of
that contact, the proportion of those dissatisfied has increased.
Essay 2 examines how that communication translates into member job approval.
iii
While members of Congress generally do not su↵er from the low approval ratings that
their institution has, experiences contacting Congress can a↵ect approval. Those who
contact their member of Congress are somewhat more likely to approve of their mem-
ber of Congress. However, that e↵ect varies with the constituent’s level of satisfaction
with the contact, and this e↵ect can outweigh partisanship in driving the probability
of member job approval.
Essay 3 examines how members of Congress use the franking privilege to commu-
nicate with their districts. While use of this tool has declined over time, evidence
shows that members may use this tool in an anticipatory rather than reactionary fash-
ion, and that a significant subset of members of Congress do not use the mass mailing
benefit to communicate with their districts. District and member demographics also
have some relationship to the use of this benefit.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Congress and Communication
When virtually any issue of national import arrives in the public imagination, the
first instinct of any group with a large grassroots constituency is to implore their
members to contact their member of Congress—flood the phone lines, send e-mails,
write letters, appear in person at district o ces, tweet, post to Facebook, and corner
the member of Congress at appearances and town hall meetings. This relationship,
in many ways, is baked into the structure of the Congress. The Founders sought to
have a lower house with shorter terms in order to foster closer relationships between
representatives and constituents.
Granted, the Founders were dealing with a context where members of Congress
faced arduous journeys to get back and forth between Washington and their districts,
rather than an era of easily accessible air travel, train service, electronic communica-
tions, and sta↵ budgets. Additionally, each member represented only approximately
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30,000 constituents at the beginning of the Republic—a far more manageable number
than today’s average of more than 700,000. In such a context, members must rely
more on the resources made available to them by the institution, such as websites,
a professional sta↵, district and Washington o ces, telephones, and party resources
for developing messages. At the same time, these resources could create distance be-
tween members of Congress and their constituents. How has an institution designed
to be accountable to the people adjusted to the onslaught of communications brought
about by the telecommunications revolution? What does the modern communica-
tions environment look like for members of Congress and their constituents?
Members of Congress, at the very least, wish to appear interested in the opinions
of their constituents. At the end of the day—regardless of who they raise money
from, their role in the party, or their number of appearances of Meet the Press—they
must ultimately be re-elected by their constituents. And while members represent
700,000 or so constituents, they are likely responsive to a much smaller number. Not
every individual in that 700,000 is eligible to vote, and of those eligible a significant
portion do not turn out in every election. As Fenno argues, members of Congress
have concentric constituencies that determine the likelihood that members will be
attentive and responsive to the concerns of that group. In essence, the advent of
these technologies could make it easier for members to identify and respond to those
constituents in the re-election and primary constituencies. These technologies could
also make it easier for members to understand the underlying concerns of those in
the geographic constituency (Fenno, 1978).
This explosion of communication also has a dark side. Members live much more
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in public now than at any previous point in history and also tend to spend more time
in their districts, given the increased demands placed on them by their constituen-
cies. Congress has long been an unpopular institution; as of February 2013, overall
approval of Congress hovered around the 15% mark, bottoming out at 10% in 2012
(Newport, 2013). However, the evidence remains that dissatisfaction with Congress
does not necessarily translate into wholesale change in the institution. Well over 90%
of members of Congress who seek re-election are returned to o ce, election after elec-
tion.
This project aims to examine this relationship in the modern context, its conse-
quences for congressional approval, and how members of Congress use the resources
available to them to facilitate this communication and present themselves to their con-
stituents while leveraging new sources of information. This study leverages new data
from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, as well as a dataset compiling
mass mailing data and congressional demographics, to present a case for how mem-
bers of Congress and their constituents interact today, as well as the consequences
for that communication on member approval ratings.
1.2 Who Contacts Congress?
The first essay, “Who Contacts Congress?” presents a straightforward examina-
tion of the data from the 2006, 2007, and 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election
Studies. Before moving on to any significant analysis, it is essential to establish the
basic results from the data; in essence, who contacts, why they contact, and how they
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contact their members of Congress. While the American National Election Study in-
cluded a question about whether or not respondents had contacted their member of
Congress in several studies until 1990, these questions clearly do not get at questions
of contact in the modern context, given the new forms of communication available to
citizens. Additionally, these questions were far more limited in their level of detail,
as well as limited in terms of the number of respondents. This study helps ameliorate
these issues, as it brings to bear more recent data on the question, as well as more de-
tailed questions about the reasons behind contact for constituents, what means they
use to make contact with their member of Congress, and their level of satisfaction
with that contact. Additionally, the larger sample size in these studies makes it easier
to analyze these sub-questions in more detail.
A key finding is that contact with members of Congress is more widespread now
than in the time periods covered by previous studies. This lines up with what con-
gressional sta↵ers have indicated; namely, contact from the public to Congress has
been on the increase for the last two decades as it has become easier and less costly
to make contact with public o cials via electronic means. Additionally, the vast ma-
jority of reported contact came via e-mail, which has been a blessing and a curse for
members of Congress. E-mails, if handled correctly, can be much more e cient for
sta↵ to handle. However, the sheer volume of e-mail can be overwhelming for even
the most e cient congressional sta↵.
As far as where contact comes from, the findings bear out many previous the-
ories about who contacts public o cials: namely, that contact tends to come from
those who are older (particularly senior citizens) and those who are more educated.
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In addition to demographic factors, the study also examined contact in the context
of political factors, such as partisanship and ideological extremity. In the case of
these years, those who self-identified as Republicans or Independents were somewhat
more likely to contact their member of Congress than those who self-identified as
Democrats. Additionally, those who identified as very liberal or conservative were far
more likely to contact their member of Congress, which fits with what we know about
those who claim more extreme ideological identities. This also lines up with the rea-
sons that respondents tended to give for contacting their member of Congress, which
was most often to express a position on an issue, rather than to request particularistic
benefits or arrange a visit to Washington, D.C. This is something of a departure from
the orthodox depiction of the constituent-representative relationship as presented in
standard introductory American government textbooks; in many cases, the focus is
on constituents seeking particularized benefits, such as assistance with a passport or
a Social Security problem. This result indicates that the vast majority of contact is
focused on communicating policy preferences to representatives.
The fact that most communication with Congress is focused on the policy arena
can make it di cult for constituents to have a satisfactory encounter with their repre-
sentative. The final component of the first essay explores whether or not constituents
come away from their communications with their representatives satisfied. If a con-
stituent is expressing an opinion on an issue, the member may or may not have fully
developed a position on said issue and cascaded that position to constituent-facing
sta↵. Not every member is fully briefed and informed on every bill or every issue that
comes across the wire, making it more di cult for constituents to receive a satisfac-
5
tory response to a position statement. Additionally, some constituents may consider
themselves satisfied with the contact only if they come away from the contact know-
ing that their representative agrees with them on said issue. This can be contrasted
with constituents seeking particularized benefits or arranging trips to Washington,
DC. In many cases, those concerns can be resolved relatively quickly and concretely.
Overall, most people are satisfied with the contact that they have with their member
of Congress, though that level of satisfaction has declined in recent years, indicating
that the increased volume of communication may not be well-received on Capitol Hill.
1.3 Communication with Congress and Member
Job Approval
The second essay, “Communication with Congress and Member Job Approval,”
examines the consequences of these communications on constituent perceptions of
member job performance. Members of Congress, being “single-minded seekers of
re-election” (Mayhew, 1974), are always on the hunt for new ways to bolster their
standing with those they represent in hopes of maximizing the certainty that they
will continue to hold o ce. Given that members’ activities in terms of fostering
constituent communications are one of the most direct ways they demonstrate their
utility as representatives to their constituents, it makes sense to look at the impact
that these communications can have on member job approval ratings.
Given that satisfaction with congressional communication is far from universal, it
would make sense to investigate whether that lack of satisfaction has consequences
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for job approval ratings. As noted earlier, members of Congress are dealing with
huge increases in communications volume and a simultaneous flattening and decline
in their o ce allowances and resources in terms of research and sta↵. In many ways,
for those who contact Congress, their satisfaction with that contact could serve as a
proxy for the e↵ectiveness of a member’s sta↵ operations. When constituents contact
their member of Congress, in all reality that contact is generally going through a sta↵
member, rather than directly to the member.
Additionally, those who contact Congress generally fit the profile of those who
would be most politically active and engaged—exactly the people a member of Congress
seeks to curry favor with at election time. While members of Congress generally ben-
efit from high approval ratings that Congress as an institution does not enjoy, the
source of this approval is complex. It is generally dominated by partisanship, un-
surprisingly: Those who share partisanship with their member of Congress are far
more likely to approve of their member of Congress than those who do not share
partisanship. One of the key findings in this essay is the interplay between mem-
ber job approval, partisanship, and contact satisfaction. Based on findings from this
project, a constituent not of her member’s party who has a satisfactory contact with
her member of Congress is more likely to approve of her member’s job approval than
a co-partisan who has an unsatisfactory contact. This is indicative of the power that
individualized communications can have when constituents make these determina-
tions about their perceptions of their member of Congress. Additionally, in districts
that are closely divided, members may wish to emphasize high-quality constituent
interactions and focus on their sta↵ e↵ectiveness in order to maximize the probability
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that non-co-partisans will approve of the member’s job performance.
The e↵ect of poor contact on the probability of co-partisan approval drives home
the point that member contacts with constituents are not the unmitigated good they
once were. Members of Congress once operated under the assumption that to be
known is to be liked. However, given the increased opportunities for contact, each
interaction is now as much an opportunity to fail as to succeed. Additionally, the low
overall approval for Congress may now bleed into perceptions of individual members’
job approval. It may be that with constituents coming from an initially negative
perception of members of Congress makes it more di cult for representatives to get
buy-in from their constituents. The type of contact may also play a role here; as
indicated before, most people are contacting their member of Congress to express a
position, which could make it di cult for a member to respond in a manner that
satisfies the constituent. If the vast majority of contacts are those to which a mem-
ber can’t respond easily, it stands to reason that these contacts might not work in a
positive fashion for members of Congress.
1.4 Using the Franking Privilege: An Exploration
While the first two components of this project emphasize the relationship between
members of Congress and their constituents as directed by the constituents, members
of Congress also have resources with which to present themselves to their constituents.
One of the most useful measures available is that of the Statement of Disbursements
of the House, which is published quarterly by the Clerk of the House of Representa-
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tives. This includes a report of every piece of mail sent as a mass mailing by each
member of Congress. These are defined as mailings of 500 or more substantially simi-
lar pieces of mail sent by a member of Congress. These would be the newsletters that
come to mind whenever one thinks about the use of the franking privilege. While the
member’s signature, or frank, does serve as the stamp, members are charged for the
postage cost against their Member’s Representational Allowance. These newsletters,
while highly regulated by the Franking Commission as far as content and design,
do provide an important mechanism for members to define themselves to their con-
stituency (Lipinski, 2004).
Usage of this resource is highly variable among members of Congress, for any
number of reasons. The franking privilege is zero-sum; a dollar spent on sending mail
to the district cannot be spent on travel, sta↵ salaries, or rent for district o ces. As
such, given the challenges in targeting constituents using the postal system, members
may opt not to make use of this asset. In addition, the advent of electronic tools such
as websites, e-mail newsletters, Twitter, and Facebook allow members to not only
communicate directly with their constituencies but also respond much more quickly
to the events of the day. A newsletter may require several weeks’ or months’ lead
time to be compiled, formatted, and mailed; electronic newsletters could require a
matter of hours, and Facebook and Twitter are designed for virtually instantaneous
communication.
However, members of Congress do leverage this tool for their purposes with some
revealing patterns. Members elected to o ce with smaller margins in 2006 sent sig-
nificantly more mailings to their districts, as one might expect. Vote share is the most
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powerful explanatory variable when predicting mailing behavior in the year immedi-
ately after the election; the explanatory power of this variable decreases in election
years, likely in response to anticipated electoral challenges. In 2008, district charac-
teristics were far more predictive of mailing behavior in a multivariate regression.
An interesting finding is the presence of “zero mailers” who opted out of using
this resource entirely. These zero mailers tended to be white, male, and from urban
districts, and the 2007 cohort generally enjoyed significant margins of victory in their
2006 contests. There were, interestingly, more zero mailers in 2008 than in 2007,
contradicting what might be expected in the case of an election year. This is likely
reflective of more awareness of electoral dynamics in the district, or a preference to
avoid the hassle of sending mass mailings with the more burdensome regulations im-
posed by the Committee on House Administration in election years.
1.5 Conclusion
The shifting communications landscape presents challenges and opportunities for
researchers. New data that dig deeper into the perceptions constituents have of their
representatives make it more reasonable to draw conclusions about how that relation-
ship functions. Additionally, moving data previously available only in hard copy into
a more easily analyzable format gives valuable insight into how members of Congress
approach the most directly representational aspects of their position. This project
takes advantage of these new resources and integrates them into a broader dialogue
about how members of Congress and those they represent navigate the unfamiliar
10
waters of the constituent-representative relationship.
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Chapter 2
Who Contacts Congress?
2.1 Introduction
Members of the House of Representatives hold a unique position in the structure
of the federal government. They represent distinct geographic districts but are o -
cers of the federal government. The House was designed by the Framers to serve as
the representative of the people in the new government, tied closely to the needs of
the people and subject to frequent elections. As Madison argued in Federalist 57, the
nature of frequent elections is to force members of Congress to serve their constituents
faithfully and to be responsive to their needs (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 2005). In
order to be responsive to one’s constituents, a member of Congress must be in contact
with his or her constituents and respond to them as necessary. This dialogue forms
the relationship between member and district between election days and helps shape
the form of political engagement in the United States.
What does this dialogue between members of Congress and their constituents
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look like? In particular, how do citizens use the communication tools available to
them to inform their members of Congress of their opinions on the issues of the day?
Answering these questions will help us understand the process of representation, in
addition to the inputs and outcomes—i.e., who votes and who gets elected. There are
twenty-four months between general elections; the discussion between member and
constituent continues by necessity beyond the results announced on election night.
At its most basic level, the representative-constituent relationship functions much
as the Federalists envisioned it: Constituents elect members of Congress; members
of Congress go to Washington and make policy; members then return to the district
to stand for re-election. If the constituents like the policies the member supported,
the member will be returned to o ce. If not, the constituents will vote out the
member of Congress. But what happens between election days? Communication be-
tween member and constituent does not end at the ballot box. Every year, hundreds
of thousands of people contact their members of Congress, and these contacts help
inform the behavior and preferences of members of Congress. The results of these
contacts also inform constituents’ evaluations of members of Congress. What types
of constituents contact the member of Congress to express an opinion or ask for help?
This analysis tackles the issue from the constituent’s point of view. There are four
key questions to be examined: who contacts their representative, for what reasons,
using what methods, and their satisfaction with that contact. This analysis utilizes
data from the MIT subset of the the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study,
the 2007 and 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies Common Content, and
the 2008 CCES Panel Survey, all of which include data on contact with members of
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Congress. It will highlight not only demographic patterns of contact with members
of Congress, but the frequency of use of various methods of contact, including tradi-
tional means and electronic or online tools.
The evolution of communication technology in the last twenty-five years, from
e-mail to cell phones and text messaging, as well as social media tools, calls for a
re-examination of how members of Congress stay connected with their districts. This
topic has also been on the mind of policymakers as of late. Contrary to traditional
beliefs about the lack of political participation by the American electorate, many
members of Congress find themselves overwhelmed by information from constituents.
As sta↵ budgets have not expanded markedly in the last two decades, the Congress
is in many ways su↵ering from information overload (Fitch and Goldschmidt, 2005).
The growth of these technologies has been the subject of much frustration on Capi-
tol Hill, with constituent e-mails forcing multiple shutdowns of the House e-mail
servers (Yehle, 2008). While some research shows that electronic communication has
not measurably lowered the barriers to communication that citizens encounter, other
research has shown that electronic communication is the preferred format for those
new to political participation (Best and Kreuger, 2005; Fitch and Goldschmidt, 2005).
However, research from congressional o ces shows that members of Congress place a
high priority on responding e↵ectively to communications from constituents (Fitch,
Goldschmidt and Cooper, 2011).
While many would hail this development as a positive one, congressional sta↵ers
indicate that this has made listening to and understanding their constituents much
more di cult, as there are few standard mechanisms in place to facilitate the use of
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electronic communication between members of Congress and their districts. Given
security concerns that have arisen in Congress after the attacks of September 11,
2001, as well as the anthrax mailings shortly thereafter, many congressional o ces
encouraged constituents to avoid using postal mail to communicate with Washington
o ces due to delays in receiving mail, instead encouraging alternative communica-
tions, especially through e-mail (Fitch and Goldschmidt, 2005).
As congressional sta↵ and members of Congress are confronted with these changes,
the ways that they allocate their time and energy have reason to change in order to
keep up with the needs of their district, with possible repercussions on constituent
satisfaction with their contact with their member of Congress. In recent years, de-
bates over health care and other major policy decisions have also brought out a new
wave of activists, but have made some members of Congress less enthusiastic at the
prospect of interacting with their constituents, given the amount of vitriol involved
in face-to-face engagement with citizens in some situations (Stolberg, 2009).
Likewise, much of this participation may not have the results that constituents
are looking for. Many citizens will participate in large-scale e-mail or postcard cam-
paigns facilitated by interest groups in the hopes that their position can influence the
behavior or policies pursued by their representatives. These types of facilitated com-
munications obviously lower the barrier to communications for many constituents,
as the work of identifying one’s representative, figuring out a means to engage in
contact, and writing the content of that contact has already been performed by the
interest group. However, approximately half of the Congressional sta↵ers interviewed
by the Congressional Management Foundation indicate that they do not believe the
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veracity of form e-mails. Sta↵ers believe that the electronic mail organized by inter-
est groups is sent without the knowledge or consent of the constituent. Additionally,
given the minimal e↵ort required to forward or copy and paste a form e-mail, con-
gressional sta↵ and members of Congress may discount such communications when
triaging constituent interactions, as such a level of e↵ort does not obviously corre-
late with intensive attention to an issue. Overall, it appears that the e↵ect of these
communications is to increase the volume of communication with Congress, increase
the number of unique citizens contacting their members of Congress, and increase the
workload in individual o ces, with an accompanying decline in the overall quality of
communications (Fitch and Goldschmidt, 2005).
Little is known about these citizens who contact their members of Congress. Prior
research indicates that those who contact politicians at all levels are more likely to
be white, older, and better educated (Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995), indicating
the possibility of a skewed sense of what the public wants getting presented to those
in power. It is not yet known if online political activity serves to level the playing field
or simply exacerbates the inequalities already in place. Recent research indicates that
approximately 44% of those who engage in online political activity are relatively new
to political participation, which may be a positive indicator for a more representative
set of voices (Fitch and Goldschmidt, 2005). However, electronic communications and
political participation, to date, appear to make it easier for those who are already
likely to communicate to do so.
There are certainly digital divides with regard to access to the Internet; how-
ever, public access to these resources is growing at an astronomical rate. Recent
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statistics indicate that 74% of American adults are at least occasional users of the
internet, though access does show a skew towards the younger and the more a✏uent
(Pew Center for Internet and American Life, 2008). Recent research indicates that
while the motivations for political participation on the Internet are di↵erent than
those for traditional forms of participation, participation still skews toward those of
higher socioeconomic status (Best and Kreuger, 2005). It is theoretically possible
that ease of communication has lowered the cost of political engagement, leading to
more widespread and equitable political activity. However, it is just as likely, and
perhaps even more so, that these new forms of communication are another tool in the
arsenal of already-engaged citizens. Recent survey research indicates that those who
contact their members of Congress are more likely to be involved in their community
in other ways (Fitch and Goldschmidt, 2005).
As noted earlier, this analysis aims to answer four questions. First, who are the
people who contact Congress? Those who choose to have contact with their member of
Congress may follow the traditional patterns of political participation, and are older,
better educated, and wealthier, or they may be more representative of the population
as a whole. Second, what means do they use to contact their member of Congress?
Anecdotal evidence from congressional o ces indicates that there has been an uptick
in the proportion of communications coming through member websites, with a de-
cline in receipt of letters and phone calls. As mentioned above, in some ways this
reflects the preferences of congressional o ces in terms of their ability to respond
to constituent communications in a timely manner. It remains to be seen, however,
whether this holds true over a larger population. Third, why do people choose to
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contact their members of Congress? Members of Congress cannot do much on their
own about large-scale policy initiatives and are often beholden to party discipline
when casting votes on controversial bills, but they can certainly help with arranging
tours of the White House and tracking down lost Social Security checks. Do citizens
call to express opinions or to seek particularized benefits? Finally, do these contacts
have satisfactory results for the constituents—are they ultimately happy with their
contact?
Likewise, it is also important to understand how constituents remember these in-
teractions, as that is what people carry with them into the voting booth. After all,
if there is minimal marginal e↵ect, why should members of Congress devote their
limited time and resources to behaviors without a payo↵? The survey includes ques-
tions about how constituents perceive the interactions that they have with members
of Congress, including their satisfaction with the results of the contact.
2.2 Prior Research
As contact with Congress has skyrocketed, the available research on this subject
su↵ers from a lag and has generally been concentrated in the policymaking arena,
rather than academic studies.
The relationship between members of Congress and their constituents can be a
fickle one. With the average Congressional district population topping 650,000 peo-
ple, it can be di cult to foster close relationships with one’s constituents. Likewise,
constituents may not always be fully informed or cognizant of the nature of the mem-
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ber of Congress’ job, or the limitations on his or her sta↵. In some cases, members
of Congress or their sta↵s are barred from intervention, or the constituent may not
understand the di↵erence between a federal and state matter. They may not be in-
formed as to lead times for assistance with certain issues, or they may have unrealistic
expectations as to the speed with which caseworkers are able to act or the vagaries
of the legislative process. Members of Congress are not all-powerful, nor are they
entirely independent in the choices they make when casting votes or dealing with the
writing and development of legislation. Nevertheless, an integral part of a function-
ing democracy, for better or for worse, may be open lines of communication between
representatives and the represented.
These open lines of communication serve purposes beyond fostering goodwill to-
ward the demands of a democratic republic. Strong communications operations can
also have significant electoral benefits for members of Congress. Given the wisdom
that members of Congress exist as “single minded seekers of re-election” (Mayhew,
1974), any activity that increases the probability of re-election is worthwhile, and so
making sure that these lines of communication are open and well-oiled can certainly
bring benefits on Election Day. Long-standing wisdom in political science indicated
that, in general, to be known by one’s constituents was to be liked, and that contact
with constituents would nearly always lead to a positive impression. O↵ering high-
quality constituent services and access was key to the development of a “personal
vote,” allowing the member some leeway in voting in Washington (Cain, Ferejohn
and Fiorina, 1987; Bianco, 1994). Members of Congress develop a “home style” that
allows them to present themselves to their constituents in the district, emphasizing
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certain aspects of their personality, experience, or preferences in Washington in or-
der to relate to one’s constituents (Fenno, 1978). However, other research has found
that the role of constituency service in securing electoral success is disputable at best
(Johannes and McAdams, 1981; McAdams and Johannes, 1988). However, regard-
less of what the political science literature may demonstrate, members of Congress
are unlikely to shut down their mail operations and their district o ces or fire their
casework sta↵. As members of Congress place value on responding to constituents,
research about members of Congress ought to do the same.
Members of Congress are confronted with a wide variety of communications, and
overworked and potentially overwhelmed sta↵ must manage their perceptions of the
communications they receive, along with the expectations of their constituents. From
the point of view of a sta↵ member, forwarding an e-mail organized by an interest
group is very di↵erent from long-term contact in order to negotiate the federal bu-
reaucracy or receive personalized services, and data have not often been able to get
at some of these di↵erences. The data used in this study, particularly the 2008 CCES
panel data, include questions adding more detail to how we understand the reasons
and means for communicating with Congress. Prior research has generally covered
only policy-oriented contact, while many citizens do initiate contact with their mem-
ber of Congress for reasons other than expressing a policy preference. As far as
hypotheses, I expect that use of electronic communications will be more frequent in
younger age groups and that traditional gender, age, and education di↵erences in
contacting will still be present, but the overall likelihood of contact with Congress
will be somewhat higher across the board demographically.
20
Descriptive characteristics of the members of Congress, such as their race and
gender, can also have an e↵ect. The role of descriptive representation is still not
fully understood in the political science literature, but it can certainly provide some
benefits to a member of Congress. Racial congruence can drive some contact and
approval of members of Congress, though its e↵ect is limited outside the direct re-
lationship between representative and constituent (Gay, 2002). Gender congruence
can also have an e↵ect, though it is less than partisanship or race (Box-Ste↵ensmeier
et al., 2003; Lawless, 2004), but it is certainly an element of one’s identity that is not
perfectly correlated with any particular policy profile. Making sure that one’s con-
stituents can identify and relate to these elements of a member’s profile can certainly
help a member of Congress hold on to his or her seat, though given the diversity in
many districts, it can rarely secure a majority.
This mechanism of communication is essential for facilitating the ideals of rep-
resentation that best fit conventional wisdom. Representatives are generally tasked
with representing the substance of their constituents’ preferences—voting in accor-
dance with what they want, with sanctions for doing otherwise. Indeed, prior research
has found a relatively strong relationship between district preferences and member
voting behavior, though little is known about how well citizens comprehend their
own policy preferences or the voting records of their representatives (Converse, 1964;
Canes-Wrone, Brady and Cogan, 2002; Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson, 1995; An-
solabehere and Jones, 2010). However, as the number of citizens per representative
increases with the population of the United States and districts inevitably become
more heterogeneous, it is important to parse out how members of Congress solicit
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and receive the views and needs of their constituents, and how constituents leverage
advances in communications technology to make their views known to their represen-
tatives. By the same token, members of Congress also have a more di cult job in
communicating the meaning of their actions back to their constituents, in hopes of
maintaining electoral safety.
The presumption has generally been that the act of contacting a member of
Congress is the crucial part of the information flow. However, the process does not
end there. The constituent’s recall of the interaction is also essential. Conventional
wisdom has generally held that each contact is a win-win situation for the member
of Congress. It’s an opportunity to get credit, advertise, and have the attention of
a constituent outside the context of potentially negative electioneering rhetoric. In
many cases, it is also an opportunity to give particularized attention to constituents,
rather than simply hoping that they will see campaign advertising or remember in-
formation from a congressional newsletter, and to create a positive impression. But
it may be possible that contact actually opens up an opportunity for members of
Congress to fall short. Given that many contacts with members of Congress may
be due to constituents’ disagreement with their representatives, it can be di cult
to bring those constituents around. Additionally, while members of Congress often
have strong links with the bureaucracy in order to facilitate the experiences of their
constituents, the bureaucracy does not always act as quickly or e↵ectively as a mem-
ber of Congress might like, leading to disappointment on the part of the constituent.
In today’s communications environment, accessibility is taken as a matter of course.
Members of Congress are available not only through phone, e-mail, and postal mail,
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but through other services such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. While this can
be a potential boon to share positive events with constituents, it can also serve to
extend the life of a ga↵e or spread it to a wider audience. Members of Congress have
begun to cite their expanded accessibility to constituents as a major factor impeding
lawmaking and driving some members away from the job (Allen, 2012).
Indeed, sta↵ers in many congressional o ces have cited massive increases in mail
volume to their o ces as a new challenge. A 2011 report from the Congressional
Management Foundation indicated that some o ces have experienced a more-than-
doubling of constituent mail since 2002, and an attendant shift of communications
priorities from traditional mail operations to electronic mail operations. However,
this study also noted that members’ o ces are becoming more e↵ective at manag-
ing these communications, deploying electronic responses to speed up response time
(Fitch, Goldschmidt and Cooper, 2011). However, congressional sta↵ are ultimately
somewhat dubious about the utility and e cacy of these communications from con-
stituents, particularly communications directed by interest groups. Many sta↵ mem-
bers report that the most e cacious tool for a constituent to sway an undecided
member of Congress is actually old-fashioned–in-person visits. Sta↵ also report that
e-mails and postal letters can have some influence, but many sta↵ also believe that
advocacy campaigns based on form letters are not true representations of constituent
opinion (Goldschmidt, 2011).
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2.3 Data and Methods
The data for this project come from the MIT subset of the 2006 Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (CCES), the 2007 and 2008 Cooperative Congressional
Election Study Common Content, and the 2008 CCES Panel Study (Ansolabehere,
2006, 2007, 2009b,a). All of the surveys were administered via a web-based form by
YouGov/Polimetrix. The 2006 MIT study has 1,013 respondents; the 2007 Common
Content has 10,000 respondents, and the 2008 Common Content has 32,800 respon-
dents. The 2008 Panel study has 2,000 respondents who were also interviewed in 2006
and 2007, though the questions relevant to this study were asked only on the 2008
wave of the panel. The format of the survey provides opportunities for innovation
in survey research, particularly in the ease of allowing for multiple responses and
administering branched questions.
The surveys were undertaken by Polimetrix (later YouGov/Polimetrix) of Palo
Alto, CA. This sample leverages a sample matching methodology combining an opt-
in internet survey panel with a consumer file covering more than 95% of American
adults. This matched sample is designed to closely resemble a target random sam-
ple and has exceeded some RDD surveys in predicting election results and turnout
(Vavreck and Rivers, 2008).
The battery of questions about contact with House members on the all of the
surveys started with a basic question about whether the respondents had contacted
their member of Congress for any reason. If the respondent indicated yes, he was pre-
sented with a question about how satisfied he was with that contact. The study also
included questions on whether the respondent could remember any projects brought
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back to the district by the member. On the 2008 panel study, the respondent was
presented with the same question about contact with his member of Congress as
on the Common Content, and if the respondent answered yes, the respondent was
then presented with a series of questions about their reason for contacting member of
Congress (to express a position on an issue, for help with a problem, or to arrange a
visit to Washington, DC), his means of contact with his member of Congress (e-mail,
phone, postal mail, fax, in-person, or other), and his satisfaction or dissatisfaction
with the contact. This allows for much broader examinations of constituent contact
with Congress because the questions probe into methods of contact, reasons behind
the contact, and the constituent’s ultimate satisfaction with contact, and the larger
sample sizes allow for easier analysis of the results.
Examining both the act of contacting and the resulting level of satisfaction allows
for a more in-depth analysis of the data and to see whether contact with an unsatis-
factory outcome has a negative impact on the probability of member approval, and
whether its magnitude matches that of a positive contact. The survey also included
traditional batteries of attitudinal questions about policy positions and economic per-
ceptions, and demographic characteristics including self-reports of level of interest in
politics and public a↵airs, and self-reported strength of ideology. The incumbent
was identified by name to prime the traditional 5-point job approval question, with
the respondent asked what party the candidate is a member of after answering that
question. The models also include an indicator variable for whether the seat was
contested or not.
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2.4 Who Contacts?
Contact with any government o cial by a citizen has traditionally been considered
a somewhat rare political activity, and contact with Congress is no di↵erent. Par-
ticularly in the past and prior to widespread internet-based communications, it has
required knowledge of who one’s member of Congress is, identifying an appropriate
means by which to contact one’s member of Congress (in-person, phone, postal mail),
the time and energy to write a letter or make a phone call, and often an investment in
the outcome of an issue or a particular need for assistance, as well as the knowledge
that a member of Congress can be useful in such a context. Particularly prior to the
advent of member websites that can centralize useful information, citizens may not
have been aware that their members of Congress had resources that they can take ad-
vantage of, such as caseworkers to help them navigate the federal bureaucracy. Table
2.1 presents data from the American National Election Studies about the frequency of
contact with members of Congress in all the years that the question was asked by the
ANES (Michigan, 2002). The rates of contact with Congress hovered around the 15%
mark in each year the question was asked. All of these years were, of course, prior
to the widespread use and availability of electronic communications via the internet
and e-mail, meaning that each of the respondents had contact through postal mail,
telephone, or in person.
These rates reflect the larger investment of time and energy required to contact
one’s member of Congress prior to the telecommunications revolution. As noted
above, prior to member websites and the “Write your Rep” system, contacting one’s
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R Ever Contact Congressman Year of Study
1978 1980 1986 1990 Total
Yes 15.3 14.1 15.3 14.7 14.9
No 84.7 85.9 84.7 85.3 85.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2.1: Reported Contact, American National Election Studies
member of Congress was a multi-step process: identifying who one’s member of
Congress was, locating the appropriate address or phone number, which may have
taken a phone book or a trip to the library, writing a letter or making a phone call,
or appearing in-person at a member’s o ce, and waiting for a response if necessary.
Additionally, many people are not well-informed about what a member of Congress’
o ce is able to help with. Now, a simple Google search can bring up a member’s
webpage that solicits constituent communication, identifies the member’s positions on
some issues, lays out processes for certain interactions with Congress (e.g., requesting
a flag flown over the Capitol), and lists what members are able to help with, such as
seeking federal grants or tracking down veterans’ benefits. This increase in communi-
cation reflected from the NES data moving to the CCES data also reflects information
about the increased volume of electronic communication reported by groups such as
the Congressional Management Foundation (Fitch, Goldschmidt and Cooper, 2011;
Goldschmidt, 2011).
Moving on to more recent data, Table 2.2 presents data from the 2006 MIT CCES
sample and the 2007 and 2008 CCES Common Content on overall rates of contact
with members of Congress for various demographic groups. Overall, less than half
of the sample engaged in contact with their member of Congress, though these rates
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are higher than those seen in the ANES studies cited above. In all likelihood, this
reflects the modern ease of contact with members of Congress, as well as, paradoxi-
cally, increased solicitation of contact by members of Congress through means such
as robo-calls and electronic newsletters. Many congressional sta↵ report that they
believe the growth of technology has increased the ease with which constituents con-
tact their o ces and participate in the policy process (Goldschmidt, 2011). Notably,
the 2008 data reflects a lower rate of contact (though still higher than the data from
the ANES). This could represent the larger sample size, indicating that the sample
is somewhat less engaged than the samples from 2006 and 2007. Additionally, there
is somewhat less solicitation of contact at certain points of election years because of
the restrictions placed on the franking privilege, in both traditional postal mail and
electronic communications.
In many ways, the patterns reflect the demographic patterns one would expect
when making any examination of political contact with government. Middle-aged
and older respondents are more likely to get in touch with their member of Congress.
In terms of gender, larger proportion of men report contact with their member of
Congress, by approximately ten percentage points. There are also racial disparities
in contact with members of Congress. White respondents show a much higher pro-
portion reporting contact, with African American respondents less likely to report
contact. Hispanic respondents are somewhat more likely to indicate contact with
their member of Congress than African American respondents, and white respon-
dents are also more likely to have contact with their member of Congress.
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Group 2006 2007 2008
Overall 39.92 42.20 28.47
Age
18-24 35.39 26.03 15.23
25-34 26.76 31.82 14.99
35-44 41.68 35.57 27.34
45-54 45.06 44.68 32.50
55-64 50.97 53.19 37.10
65-74 57.70 56.63 41.52
75+ 23.53 49.30 40.97
Gender
Men 32.88 49.77 32.88
Women 24.78 35.57 24.78
Race
White 43.21 44.17 32.06
Black 18.67 27.39 15.50
Hispanic 37.12 38.15 18.51
Asian 24.82 23.40 15.85
N 1013 9933 32307
Table 2.2: Frequency of Reported Member Contacts by Age Group, Gender and Race
Political factors can also play a role in shaping the profile of the people contacting
their member of Congress. Partisanship, ideological positioning, interest and engage-
ment with politics, and perceived partisan congruence are all potential, and highly
likely, explanatory factors for determining who contacts their member of Congress.
Party 2006 2007 2008
Republican 40.71 45.08 35.89
Democrat 39.99 41.51 27.23
Independent 43.37 47.15 21.37
Table 2.3: Frequency of Reported Member Contacts by Party
Table 2.3 presents the frequency with which reported partisans, including lead-
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ers, report contacting their member of Congress. In 2006 and 2007, self-reported
Independents were most likely to report contacting their member of Congress, while
Republicans and Democrats were somewhat less likely to do so. This trend shifted
in 2008, with self-identified partisans contacting their members of Congress more
frequently than independents. However, the overall rates of contact for the sample
dropped somewhat in 2008 across the board, perhaps reflecting a broader cross-section
of respondents and presenting a somewhat more realistic portrait of the profile of the
population making contact with their member of Congress.
Ideological Extremity 2006 2007 2008
Moderate 40.67 39.43 25.88
Liberal or Conservative 42.19 39.43 32.56
Very Liberal or Conservative 53.89 57.36 40.91
No Response 15.42 14.05 8.47
N 1,013 10,000 32,800
Table 2.4: Frequency of Reported Member Contacts by Ideological Extremity
Table 2.4 presents the frequency of contact with members of Congress broken out
by self-reported ideological extremity. This variable was created by collapsing the
self-reported ideological scale into a three-point scale of moderate, liberal or conser-
vative, or very liberal conservative, rather than a left-right spectrum. This captures
a broader picture of the e↵ect of ideological intensity, rather than ideological content,
in terms of driving contact with elected o cials. People who self-identify as very
liberal or very conservative are more likely to contact their member of Congress, with
self-identified moderates somewhat less likely to make contact with their member of
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Congress. Interestingly, those reporting no ideology at all were much less likely to
report contact with their member of Congress; this may well reflect a broader lack of
interest in politics. Those reporting themselves as some sort of ideologue are more
likely to pay attention to politics and have clear opinions on issues facing legislators.
As such, it is reasonable that they would find more reason to contact their members
of Congress, as they may have more areas of agreement or disagreement to commu-
nicate to their representatives. Individuals reporting these clear political preferences
are also more likely to turn out to vote, indicating that members of Congress may
wish to cater to these individuals, given the potential for reward or punishment at
the ballot box.
Party Congruence 2006 2007 2008
Same Party 45.21 49.02 42.78
Di↵erent Party 36.92 38.61 21.04
N 1,013 10,000 32,800
Table 2.5: Frequency of Reported Member Contacts by Partisan Congruence
Table 2.5 presents the rates of contact with members of Congress based on per-
ceived party congruence. This is based on the respondent’s self-reported party iden-
tification, including leaners, and their response to a question asking them for the
party identification of their member of Congress. If the perceived party is the same
as the respondent, the variable is coded 1; otherwise it is coded 0. This captures
some elements of both political awareness and partisan perception. The data show
that co-partisans are somewhat more likely to contact their members of Congress.
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This could be because having a representative of your own party in o ce could drive
partisan engagement, leading to more opportunities for contact. This would give it a
somewhat similar e↵ect to racial congruence (Gay, 2002), though partisanship is less
a case of symbolic or descriptive representation. A similar but opposite e↵ect could
also be present, with non-co-partisans feeling alienated from the political process and
therefore less likely to engage with their representatives in Congress.
This could have significant implications for members’ expected communications
based on their district composition. If a member represents a district that is quite
safe, she could expect more communications, given she might have a more engaged
electorate. However, some of the data that will be presented later on franking indicate
that members of Congress who represent districts with majority partisan identifiers
di↵erent from their own, or districts that are closely divided, do engage somewhat
more with their constituencies through the franking privilege. The e↵ects of this com-
munication on constituent responses are somewhat unclear, but it does appear that
from the constituents’ point of view, they may feel that they have a more favorable
reception from their members of Congress if their member of Congress shares their
partisan preferences.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present the analysis of the 2007 CCES Panel Study Common
Content. For the most part, the results reflect the expected direction and intensity
of the e↵ects of various potential influences on the probability of contacting one’s
member of Congress. Overall, creating a baseline of a white male between the ages
of 45-54 who is a Republican and of the same race and party of his member of
Congress generates an overall predicted probability of contact of .398. This would
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  SE z P> |z|
Political Interest 1.080 .042 0.000
Ideological Extremity .187 .035 0.000
Party ID .151 .038 0.000
Representative’s Party -.210 .025 0.000
Party Congruence -.054 .054 0.312
Gender -.010 .050 0.828
Racial Congruence .333 .059 0.000
Race (white/nonwhite) .083 .066 0.210
Age group .169 .017 0.000
Education .126 .017 0.000
Constant -4.00 .171 0.000
N 8663
Pseudo R2 0.1425
Log-likelihood -5111.3793
Table 2.6: Logit Estimates of Contact with Member of Congress, 2007 Common
Content
  SE Lower 95%CI Upper 95% CI
Overall probability of contact .398 .022 .357 .444
HS Diploma! 4-Year Degree .091 .012 .067 .116
Age 25-34!45-54 .077 .008 .062 .092
Di↵erent! Same Party -.013 .013 -.039 .015
Di↵erent !Same Race .081 .014 .053 .108
Low ! High interest .476 .016 ,445 .506
Moderate!Strong Ideology .092 .017 .058 .126
Table 2.7: First Di↵erences: Probability of Contact with Member of Congress, 2007
Common Content
reflect general expectations of political contact—generally oriented toward older, more
a✏uent individuals. Political interest, not surprisingly, is the driving force behind
much of the results, leading to a di↵erence of .576 when moving an individual’s self-
reported political interest from low to high. Ideology and education have similar
e↵ects, though not nearly as large as political interest.
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Factors that are more independent of the individual have negative e↵ects in the
case of these data and this baseline individual. Moving an individual from not sharing
partisanship to co-partisanship and moving from racial non-congruence to congruence
both had slight negative e↵ects on the probability of contact.
However, simply moving o↵ of one simple baseline does not give the full picture.
When the variables are reset to reflect a di↵erent individual profile, the overall rates
of change do vary. For example, in Table 2.8, the baseline is a non-white woman
between the ages of 25-34 who is a Democrat represented in Congress by a Republican
who identifies as moderate and has some college, and claims moderate attention
to and interest in politics. The results are similar but reflect definite distinctions
in how di↵erent types of individuals might respond to structural changes in their
representation.
  SE Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI
Overall probability of contact .320 .018 .285 .357
HS Diploma! 4-Year Degree .080 .011 .059 .102
Age 25-34!45-54 .077 .008 .062 .093
Di↵erent! Same Party -.012 .012 -.035 .014
Di↵erent !Same Race .068 .012 .043 .092
Low ! High interest .443 .017 .410 .475
Moderate!Strong Ideology .081 .015 .051 .0112
Table 2.8: First Di↵erences: Probability of Contact with Member of Congress, 2007
Common Content
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 present the results of a logit estimator predicting contact
with members of Congress for the Common Content sample in 2008. The model
controls for the respondent’s perceived party congruence (drawn from self-reported
party identification, and their representative’s party identification), age, race (coded
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  SE z P> |z|
Political Interest .693 .029 24.29 .000
Ideological Extremity .200 .020 10.24 .000
Party Identification .182 .022 8.29 .000
Representative’s Party -.402 .013 -31.26 .000
Party Congruence -.308 .030 10.30 .000
Gender .137 .028 4.82 .000
Racial Congruence .432 .039 11.06 .000
Race (white/nonwhite) .175 .042 4.22 .000
Age Group .127 .009 13.77 .000
Education .147 .010 15.29 .000
Constant -3.826 .105 -36.43 .000
N 29085
Pseudo R2 0.1550
Log-likelihood -15472.364
Table 2.9: Logit Estimates of Contact with Member of Congress, 2008 Common
Content
  SE Lower 95%CI Upper 95% CI
Overall Probability of Contact .307 .012 .284 .331
HS Diploma! 4-Year Degree .096 .006 .082 .110
Age 25-34!45-54 .051 .004 .043 .058
Di↵erent! Same Party .069 .007 .056 .084
Di↵erent !Same Race .099 .008 .082 .114
Low ! High interest .288 .010 .268 .308
Moderate!Strong Ideology .091 .009 .073 .109
Table 2.10: First Di↵erences: Probability of Contact with Member of Congress, 2008
Common Content
as white/nonwhite), gender, racial congruence with their member of Congress, 3-
point party identification level of education, self-reported level of interest in and
attention to politics, and whether the respondent identifies as a moderate, weak lib-
eral/conservative, or strong liberal/conservative.
Table 2.10 presents first di↵erences generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, Witten-
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berg and King, 2003). Overall, creating a baseline of a white male between the ages
of 45-54 who is a Republican of the same race and party of his member of Congress
generates an overall predicted probability of contact of .307. The usual suspects as
far as demographics have the biggest impact on probability of contact with one’s
member of Congress. Those who are white, middle aged, and better educated are
all more likely to contact their members of Congress. The biggest e↵ect comes in
the shape of interest in politics. Moving the respondent from a self-report of low
interest in politics and public a↵airs to a high level of interest in politics and public
a↵airs increases the probability of contact with one’s member of Congress by .288.
Education also has a large e↵ect, with a move from a high school diploma to a 4-year
degree leading to a near 10% increase in the probability of their contacting a member
of Congress. Age and race also have small but significant e↵ects on the probabil-
ity of contact, with older respondents and white respondents more likely to contact
their members of Congress. Areas of congruence also have small e↵ects. Moving the
baseline respondent from a party di↵erential to the same party as their member of
Congress produces a change of .069; moving from a di↵erent race to the same race as
one’s member of Congress increases the probability of contact by .099.
A note of caution is important, particularly with the 2008 results. Significance is
less useable with this set of data given the very large size of the data set; however, the
small size of the standard errors and the positioning of the 95% confidence intervals
makes it reasonable to conclude that these e↵ects are real, if not very large.
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2.5 How Contact Happens
Group E-mail Postal Mail Fax Phone In-Person
Overall 84.98 11.39 5.74 28.64 7.58
Age
18-35 82.86 15.02 9.05 24.74 9.00
36-55 86.36 12.86 6.89 28.07 5.16
56-75 85.55 8.46 7.25 30.69 5.31
76 + 73.50 6.19 11.80 33.48 1.36
Gender
Women 86.73 31.45 5.57 10.72 3.85
Men 83.55 26.34 9.22 11.95 7.29
Race
White 85.72 29.88 6.45 10.59 5.85
Black 77.27 18.22 3.47 20.46 4.88
Hispanic 81.44 13.92 23.32 12.02 1.42
Table 2.11: Means of Contact by Demographics
Table 2.11 presents data on the means through which people contact their mem-
ber of Congress.1These data are drawn from the CCES Panel Study, which had 2,000
respondents and more detailed questions about the reasons for contact with their
members of Congress and the means in which they engaged in such contact. E-mail
is the most common means of contact, which is unsurprising given the extraordinary
levels of e-mail volume reported by the Congress in recent years (Yager, 2008; Fitch
and Goldschmidt, 2005; Fitch, Goldschmidt and Cooper, 2011). Many members of
Congress, despite the volume it has created, prefer constituents make contact via e-
mail rather than postal mail due to the delays associated with postal mail operations
on Capitol Hill. Other findings are as expected; older citizens are more likely to use
1Cells add up to more than 100%, as respondents were able to choose multiple answers.
37
postal mail than younger people, with younger groups more dependent on e-mail and
telephone calls.
The role of demographics in the use of various forms of communication is an in-
teresting one. Congressional aides indicate that e-mail is less e↵ective than more
“old-fashioned” forms of communication, particularly if those e-mails are directed by
interest groups (Fitch and Goldschmidt, 2005; Goldschmidt, 2011). Congressional
sta↵ tend to be skeptical of mass e-mails that require very little e↵ort on the part of
the constituent, as they may not represent true, deep-seated convictions that could
drive electoral results. Because of this skepticism, constituents who use more e↵ec-
tive forms of communication (in-person, postal mail, and phone calls) may have more
success in presenting and advocating for their agenda. In this case, it appears that
the traditionally more privileged groups are more savvy in their use of communica-
tions, using more postal mail, in-person contacts, and phone calls to contact their
representatives, albeit with some exceptions. A larger proportion of white contactors
use phone communication and in-person contacts than black or Hispanic contactors.
Larger groups of Black and Hispanic contactors use postal mail to contact their repre-
sentatives than White contactors. Larger proportions of women use phone calls, while
larger proportions of men have in-person contacts with their members of Congress.
These proportions indicate that the advantages of more traditional forms of commu-
nication may not be restricted to traditionally privileged groups, particularly given
that congressional sta↵ report that the most e↵ective tool for persuading an unde-
cided member of Congress is the in-person contact (Goldschmidt, 2011).
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2.6 Why Contact Happens
Reason %
Express Position 91.52
Request Help 5.63
Visit DC 2.85
Table 2.12: Reasons for Contacting Congress
Table 2.12 presents data from the 2008 CCES Panel Study on the reasons that
respondents gave for their contact with members of Congress. The vast majority, over
91%, indicated that they contacted their member of Congress in order to express a
position on an issue. Less than 6% of respondents contacted their representative to
get help navigating the federal bureaucracy, and less than 3% made contact to arrange
a visit to Washington, DC. This correlates, in many ways, with other information we
have about the type of mail that members of Congress receive. Given the uncertainty
that many congressional sta↵ have about the veracity of the e-mails that their o ces
cope with, it stands to reason that that volume of mail is not coming for reasons of
particularized benefit. Rather, it is likely citizens expressing their opinion on issues
before the Congress that they care about on some level.
There is some variation in how citizens’ methods for contacting Congress inter-
act with their reasons for making contact, which can be seen in Table 2.13.2 The
vast majority of those contacting their members of Congress to express a position
2Columns may add up to more than 100% because respondents were able to make more than one
selection in the survey interface.
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Reason for Contact
Method Express Position Request Help Visit DC
Phone 6.00 8.31 5.39
E-mail 76.67 29.36 53.89
Postal Mail 7.00 25.41 3.10
Fax 7.80 4.47 0.00
In-Person 2.52 32.45 55.61
Table 2.13: Methods of Contact by Reason for Contact
do so via e-mail. This makes sense, given the overall volume of e-mail to Congress
as well as the ease with which interest groups can organize electronically. There
is somewhat more variation in how constituents request help from their members
of Congress. These respondents were divided most clearly between e-mail, postal
mail, and in-person requests. Given the nature of congressional communication, this
is also reasonable. Many members of Congress hold o ce hours or open houses in
their districts, with sta↵ members available to handle casework intake, encouraging
in-person contact. Given that there are fewer delays with regard to sending postal
mail to district o ces, which often handle constituent service issues, many respon-
dents may have found that communicating with a member of Congress’ district o ce
via postal mail is e↵ective. However, on the whole, many members of Congress do
encourage communication via e-mail, particularly given that electronic mail via the
congressional mail server can be easily fed into a constituent management software
program to track casework e↵orts. The smallest proportion of those contacting their
member of Congress were seeking assistance with arranging a visit to Washington,
DC. Notably, the largest groups here are e-mail and in-person, indicating that the
same respondents may have used both e-mail and in-person contact—for example,
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requesting gallery passes via e-mail and going to the representative’s o ce when vis-
iting Washington.
2.7 Satisfaction with Contact
Constituents may not always have a satisfactory experience when getting in touch
with their representatives. Maybe they catch a sta↵ member on a bad day or the
request cannot be fulfilled for some reason. Constituents may also have extremely
satisfactory experiences with contacting their member of Congress—experiences that
can outweigh partisan di↵erences. Members have an opportunity to help their districts
and earn their constituents’ approval through good constituent services, and some
scholars have suggested that these services can be central to a strong electoral position,
though this is disputed (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; McAdams and Johannes,
1988).
Table 2.14 presents results from the ANES from 1978 to 1990 and it shows that less
than 20% of respondents have voter-initiated contact with their members of Congress,
and less than 20% of respondents who had contact with their member of Congress
were dissatisfied with that contact.
The data presented in Table 2.15 indicate that this universal acclaim for contact
with members of Congress may no longer be the case. In the 2007 and 2008 samples
most people who contacted their member of Congress were in fact dissatisfied with
that contact. footnote2008a is the Common Content, 2008b is the panel study.While
this represents a relatively small proportion of the respondents overall, this informa-
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Satisfied Contact Year of Study
1978 1980 1986 1990 Total
Yes 89.3 83.6 89.3 85.7 87.5
No 10.7 16.4 10.7 14.3 12.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 2.14: Reported Satisfaction with Contact, National Election Studies
tion would be concerning for a member of Congress. What does it say when those
who contact a member’s o ce are coming away disappointed in the quality of that
contact? The rate of satisfaction increases in both 2008 samples, with closer to 70%
of those contacting their member of Congress coming away happy with that contact.
However, these rates are far more worrying to the member of Congress or observer of
Congress than the results from earlier years presented in Table 2.14.
Year of Study
2006 2007 2008a 2008b
Satisfied 48.07 45.88 68.96 64.96
Unsatisfied 51.93 54.12 31.04 35.04
N 482 5789 11297 1022
Table 2.15: Reported Satisfaction with Contact, CCES 2006-2008
The results from the 2008 panel sample provide some useful insight into potential
causes of this ultimate dissatisfaction from constituents. Among those giving a reason
for making contact with their member of Congress, the group most likely to approve
of their contact with their member of Congress was those arranging a visit to Wash-
ington, DC. This is probably the least contentious reason for a member of Congress to
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have contact with a constituent. The constituent is not expressing a position that the
member may have a disagreement with, nor is the constituent making contact due to
a problem with the federal bureaucracy. It is a relatively low-cost means for members
to virtually guarantee a positive result. The group least likely to be happy with their
contact is those contacting in order to express a position. Particularly during this
era, members of Congress could have very well been overwhelmed with constituents
making contact, leaving them unable to adequately communicate their positions in
such a way that they could explain their decision-making process. Congressional sta↵
do report that they believe the growth of electronic communications has, for better
or worse, made them more accountable to their constituents (Goldschmidt, 2011).
Fenno (1978) argued that members of Congress can often work their way around
disagreements with constituents by explaining their actions. If members are over-
whelmed with a deluge of e-mail and phone calls, with an already overburdened sta↵,
their ability to solidify their base through communications with their constituents is
somewhat limited.
Reason for Contact % Satisfied % Not Satisfied
Express Position 65.05 34.64
Request Help 68.50 31.50
Arrange Visit to DC 83.79 16.21
Table 2.16: Satisfaction Rates, by Reason for Contact
Table 2.17 provides data from the 2008 CCES Panel Study about the rates of
satisfaction among constituents by means of contact. Those using fax and postal
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Means of Contact %Satisfied %Not Satisfied
Phone 65.76 34.24
E-Mail 64.61 34.90
Postal Mail 50.35 49.65
Fax 49.37 50.63
In Person 77.90 22.10
Table 2.17: Satisfaction Rates by Means of Contact
mail were the least satisfied; they were also among the least-used means of contact.
Less than 6% of respondents reported using faxes as a means of contact, with less
than 12% indicating that they had sent postal mail. After the anthrax scares of 2001,
many Congressional o ces actively discouraged postal mail, indicating that the pro-
cess of inspecting mail was leading to delays in mail receipt, leading to potential
dissatisfaction with this form of contact. Those using phone and e-mail were roughly
comparable in their level of satisfaction. Those making contact with their member of
Congress in-person were the most satisfied, which is understandable, given the ability
of a member to more directly address any concerns when presented one-on-one or in a
public forum. As indicated earlier, this also the most useful method for persuading a
member of Congress who is undecided on an issue, according to many Congressional
sta↵ (Goldschmidt, 2011)
2.8 Discussion and Conclusions
More people are contacting their member of Congress today than at virtually any
time in the past. This, in many ways, simply reflects the increases in communication
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across the board, as people grow more connected through di↵erent methods. Access
to these forms of communication has not always been useful to members of Congress;
these contacts provide a useful tool for better understanding how citizens relate to
their government.
In addition, there is evidence that approval is at some level information-based,
with the more interested and educated less likely to approve of the job their member
of Congress is doing. This is somewhat surprising, but the more aware may have
more opportunities to see and evaluate misdeeds by their members of Congress, or
be more expectant of policy congruence with their member of Congress.
This work has broader implications for how we think about approval of members
of Congress. The bulk of how people evaluate their members of Congress is likely
driven by the policy preferences and partisanship of both parties. However, at the
margins, it appears that members of Congress can gain some advantage through non-
political means. The role of a better-informed electorate may not be wholly positive.
As more people learn more about politics, the possibility of diminishing returns is a
real one. More information could certainly lead to higher levels of cynicism, but for
now, it would appear that candidates have a lot to gain by publicizing their names,
party identification, and non-policy activities.
There is certainly more work to be done, particularly in unpacking the importance
of contact in congressional politics. If so many people are in contact with their mem-
bers of Congress, is it possible for contact to stay a plus for members of Congress?
How do congressional o ces handle the volume of requests they receive? In addition,
assessing the impact of measures of mail sent via the franking privilege and partic-
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ularized project expenditures in the context of how these behaviors are perceived is
another step to be taken in order to more fully understand how the dynamic of this
relationship works The importance of these nonpolitical concerns in the policymaking
process is also a question yet to be answered. At the very least, this indicates that a
more robust picture of voters’ attitudes about representation can emerge when this
data is integrated with other information about policy-based assessments of members
of Congress.
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Chapter 3
Communication with Congress and
Member Job Approval
3.1 Negotiating the Representative-Constituent Re-
lationship
If members of Congress truly are, as we have long thought them to be, “single-
minded seekers of re-election,” it stands to reason that virtually every action they
undertake is designed to pursue this end (Mayhew, 1974). From the decisions that
members of Congress make when voting on bills to how they choose to sta↵ their of-
fices, how they emphasize constituent services, and the committee memberships they
seek, the desire to remain in o ce is at the heart of virtually everything that a mem-
ber of Congress does. While members of Congress certainly have ancillary goals, such
as advancing within the chamber and producing good public policy, the fact remains
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that at the end of the day, a member must be in o ce in order to pursue those goals,
and so re-election remains an essential component of the member of Congress’ agenda
(Fenno, 1973). Members of Congress want to be liked, or if not liked, then under the
radar enough to have voters pull the lever for them while thinking, “Better the devil
you know.” With the vast majority of members of Congress getting re-elected every
two years, despite recent declines in re-election rates, it would appear that members
of Congress, if nothing else, are very good at getting elected to Congress. They ei-
ther are able to persuade people to like them enough to vote for them or can take
advantage of incumbency and convince voters to take the stand of “if it ain’t broke,
don’t fix it” and simply return them to o ce.
While re-election is certainly essential to achieving any other goals a member of
Congress might have, the relationship between a member of Congress and his or her
constituents does not conclude after the last ballot is cast. In the era of high-speed
travel, members do not simply move to Washington, D.C., and ignore their districts.
This relationship is further integrated as members of Congress can be held to ac-
count through a myriad of electronic means, including phones, e-mail, Twitter, and
Facebook. Citizens can now have a higher expectation for contact and responsiveness
from their representative in Congress.
There are certainly constituents in every district who serve as thorns in the sides
of their representatives, who are in constant contact with that o ce regardless of
what party currently holds the seat. Some of these individuals are motivated by a
particular issue; others are simply standard-issue political gadflies. At the end of
the day, however, the vast majority of constituents generally want a representative
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who will do what they want them to do and will put their needs first, whatever they
may be—grants, votes on issues, advocacy for the needs of the constituency with
the federal bureaucracy. These constituents are likely not fully aware of every action
taken by their member of Congress, and members of Congress certainly bear some
culpability in this. Depending on the composition of their district and any poten-
tial electoral challenges, members of Congress also don’t necessarily advertise actions
that could color them as partisans. Instead of highlighting their partisan bona fides,
many members of Congress tend to highlight achievements such as securing grants
for local institutions, advertising sta↵ o ce hours and available casework assistance,
highlighting the achievements of local students, and other activities that are unlikely
to anger any significant portion of one’s constituency.
Most theories have held that for a member of Congress, to be known is to be liked,
and that there is very rarely a downside to encouraging contact with one’s district,
no matter the form. As the structure and election frequency of the House of Rep-
resentatives were designed by the Founders to maintain a close connection between
representatives and their constituents, members could be seen to be fulfilling the in-
tent of the Founders by maintaining a close relationship with their constituents and
using all forms of communication available to them.
One challenge in expanding our understanding of these relationships is that much
of the seminal research on Congressional representation at the personal level took
place in the 1970s and 1980s (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1978; Fiorina, 1981; Cain, Fere-
john and Fiorina, 1987). And in general, much of this research was based on small-N
observer research or larger-scale surveys that are still unlikely to capture the full range
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of political involvement. This research is tremendously important for developing a
context for future research, but it does su↵er from discrepancies between the context
in this era and the current universe of congressional communication. Furthermore,
when much of this research was conducted, the cost to a constituent of getting in
touch with his or her member of Congress was quite high. The constituent had to
identify the member of Congress, find out his or her address and/or phone number,
write a letter or make a phone call during business hours, and maybe get a response
at some point in the future. With fewer contacts, and those coming from individuals
with a true investment in the issue or reason for that contact, sta↵ers likely were able
to take more time and e↵ort with each individual request. Across the board, this
research has found that in most situations, to be known is to be liked. The value of
individual contact with one’s constituents has often been seen as an essential compo-
nent of succeeding at the ballot box and in Congress. However, the days of having
to work to find one’s member of Congress have ended, as that information is now
at the fingertips of every American citizen. Again, the modern move towards more
accessibility through communications technology has not yet been adequately studied.
3.2 The Modern Communications Environment
As explained in the previous essay, the vast majority of contact with Congress
occurs over e-mail, and the frequency of contact with members of Congress has in-
creased significantly over the last thirty-plus years. This certainly makes contacting
one’s member of Congress less costly; many people send and receive dozens of e-mails
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in the course of a day, with little attention paid to many of them. Many interest
groups have made an e↵ort to minimize this cost even further, providing their mem-
bers with telephone scripts and copy-and-paste e-mails, as well as simple directions
for making contact with Congressional o ces. This has led to an attendant explo-
sion in electronic contact with members of Congress, though sta↵ budgets to handle
this increase in tra c have not increased accordingly (Fitch and Goldschmidt, 2005).
Sta↵ers in many o ces report a nearly exponential increase in the volume of contact
experienced by their o ces, making it hard to give each constituent the attention he
may believe he is entitled to, particularly given the e↵ective cuts in sta↵ budgets since
the 1980s. This marks a clear di↵erence between modern research and the research
performed in the 1970s and 1980s. However, most o ces do claim that managing
and responding to constituent correspondence is a high priority for their o ce (Fitch,
Goldschmidt and Cooper, 2011). Whether they are truly able to prioritize constituent
communications with the burdens on sta↵ members and the volume of contact is an
open question.
Indeed, electronic tra c to Congress has crashed the House mail servers on a
number of occasions, leading to restrictions on the use of the “Write your Represen-
tative” systems during the exact times when more citizens would be getting in touch
with their representatives, such as during debates about the Troubled Asset Relief
Program and debates over instituting health care reform (Yager, 2008). While these
systems are designed to serve as a facilitator of involvement with Congress, as well
as a tool for congressional o ces to sort and prioritize communications, having them
shut down during the very times citizens may find them useful is not likely to endear
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members of Congress to their constituents. It could reinforce perceptions of public
o cials as elitists who are cut o↵ from those they represent.
Even more traditional systems of contact with members of Congress, such as
town hall meetings and o ce phone lines, have come under fire. During times of
controversy, there have been several instances of full voice mailboxes for members of
Congress, or of ‘Press 1 for yes’ type voicemail menus to quickly record sentiments
with a minimum of sta↵ engagement. This may provide a tool for constituents to
express their preferences, but not for members to respond to them in a fashion that
constituents will find acceptable.
Given this level of scrutiny and the resources available to members of Congress,
is it truly possible for members of Congress to keep all of their constituents happy?
Probably not.
3.3 Congressional Job Approval
Congress has almost never been the most popular part of the U.S. government,
and its popularity has declined over time. Some argue that it is simply a case of famil-
iarity breeding contempt. Members of Congress are often in relatively close contact
with their constituents, their behavior is broadcast nearly constantly via C-SPAN;
and members of Congress are fixtures on the Sunday morning talk-show circuit and
on 24-hour cable news outlets. In other words, citizens are more able to see how
the proverbial sausage is made when it comes to Congress than the President or the
Supreme Court (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995). However, there has traditionally
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been a paradox at work: While the institution of Congress, or the collective body of
lawmakers, may receive a low approval rating, constituents have generally been happy
to rate their own members of Congress quite highly. Members of Congress have often
leveraged this by running “against Congress” when running for o ce (Fenno, 1978).
In recent years, many members of Congress have attempted to leverage social media
and the Internet as tools to control their messages to constituents and foster a rela-
tionship with those they represent; these tools also have the benefit of circumventing
certain House rules about constituent communications and franking.
2007 2008
Member of Congress
Approve 33.76 41.32
Disapprove 27.39 26.51
Don’t Know/Neither 38.85 32.17
N 9,833 32,536
Congress
Approve 14.74 19.59
Disapprove 65.46 71.18
Don’t Know/Neither 20.70 9.22
N 6,610 32,566
Table 3.1: Approval of Member and Approval of Congress, 2007-2008
Recent studies indicate that this insulation that members have enjoyed may be
losing its potency. As Table 3.1 shows, even when Congress is not the most popular
institution, individual members of Congress are somewhat well liked. In 2007, the
first session after the 2006 change in party control of the House, approval of Congress
as an institution hit 14.74%, while 33.76 % of respondents indicated that they ap-
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proved of the job their individual member of Congress was doing. An even larger
proportion indicated that they were unsure or had no opinion, which possibly reflects
the number of respondents who had new members of Congress after the 2006 election.
In 2008, the traditional level of approval of members of Congress was in place, with
over 40% of respondents indicating that they approve of the job performance of their
own member of Congress.
With regard to job approval of Congress as a whole, the movement in 2008 in-
dicated that more respondents had a clear opinion of the institution. The rate of
approval went up, to almost twenty percent, while disapproval also increased to over
70%. At the same time, the rate of “don’t know” respondents also dropped to less
than 10%. This represents a marked departure from the approval numbers previous
studies, which had much larger proportions of respondents indicating that they had
no opinion or a neutral opinion about their representatives and Congress as a whole.
This could be a function of increased news media coverage as a result of the 2008
elections.
Approval of one’s member of Congress is highly influenced by shared partisanship.
Co-partisans are more likely to approve of their member of Congress than those who
do not share a party label with their representative. In all likelihood, this reflects
shared priorities and preferences.
As table3.2 shows, in 2007, a small majority of those sharing partisanship with
their member of Congress, over 53%, indicated that they approved of the job their
member of Congress was doing. The measure of partisanship presented here is based
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2007 2008
Same party
Approve 53.12 76.38
Disapprove 18.98 12.68
Don’t Know/Neither 27.90 10.94
N 5,979 12,744
Di↵erent party
Approve 23.58 22.95
Disapprove 31.81 33.75
Don’t Know/Neither 44.60 43.30
N 3,854 19,792
Table 3.2: Approval of Member by Shared Partisanship, 2007-2008
on collapsing those who identify as independents but who lean toward one party or
the other into their respective partisan identifications. However, a much larger pro-
portion indicated that they had no opinion or were not sure as to whether or not they
approved of the job their member of Congress was doing, with over 27% indicating
as such, and just under 19% reporting disapproval. Again, this could reflect the fact
that there were many new members of Congress who took o ce in 2007. In 2008,
the divide between co-partisans and non-co-partisans was clear. The vast majority,
over three-quarters, of respondents who shared a party label with their member of
Congress approved of the job their member was doing in Washington. Even smaller
proportions, 12.68% and 10.94% respectively, either disapproved or had no opinion
with regard to the job performance of their representative. These are clearly the ideal
numbers for a member of Congress.
For those not sharing partisanship with their representative in Congress, the re-
sults are decidedly more mixed. In 2007, less than a quarter of non-co-partisans
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indicated that they approved of their member of Congress, and over thirty precent
indicated disapproval. However, the largest share of respondents fell into the cate-
gory of “don’t know” or neutral, which could bode well for a member of Congress
who is able to appeal across party lines. The 2008 sample indicates that members of
Congress may hold the advantage indicated in 2007, which is that those of a di↵erent
partisan persuasion than their representatives are more likely to have no opinion or
have a neutral opinion of their member of Congress than to approve or disapprove of
their job approval. Approval for those without the benefit of party congruence was
around 23% in 2008, hardly the proportions members of Congress dream of. It is
conceivable, however, that a member of Congress could use the benefits of o ce in
the form of casework and advertising to advertise non-partisan actions to those who
do not have an opinion. If a member of Congress is able to reach a constituent who
does not register an opinion through a positive casework contact, for example, it is
possible that the member could tip the balance in their favor when the constituent
goes to the polls on Election Day, riding the benefits of incumbency toward re-election.
3.4 Contact and Approval
Contacting one’s member of Congress is not an experience that is identical for ev-
eryone. Di↵erent o ces have di↵erent procedures, and members may emphasize dif-
ferent types of contacts. Some member websites, for example, encourage constituents
to communicate via e-mail, while other members strategies emphasize in-person con-
tacts at town halls or meet-and-greet events. O ces can also vary from day to day,
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meaning that constituents may not always have a satisfactory experience when get-
ting in touch with their representatives. Maybe they catch a sta↵ member on a bad
day or the citizen’s request cannot be fulfilled for some reason. Constituents may
also be misinformed about what members of Congress have responsibility for, con-
tacting Congress with a question better suited for a state or local o cial, or expecting
Congress to have more direct control over the bureaucracy than they do in reality.
Constituents may also have extremely satisfactory experiences with contacting their
member of Congress, and these experiences may be able to outweigh policy di↵erences
through emphasizing a sense of trust between member and constituent. Members have
an opportunity to help their districts and earn their constituents’ approval through
good constituent services, and some scholars have suggested that these services can
be central to a strong electoral position, though this is disputed (Cain, Ferejohn and
Fiorina, 1987; McAdams and Johannes, 1988).
Approval of one’s member of Congress is developed on a number of dimensions.
Overall, approval of one’s member of Congress has traditionally been relatively high,
particularly compared to approval of Congress as an institution or other branches of
the federal government, as indicated by Table 3.1. The strongest predictor of this
approval is traditionally partisanship, an unsurprising result. Constituents are likely
to approve of members of Congress of their own party and perhaps be less approving
of members of Congress with whom they do not share a party label.
The underlying truth is that most people are satisfied with contact. Though the
rate of constituent contact with Congress has increased over time, as the previous
essay indicates well over half of those who contact their member of Congress come
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away satisfied with that contact. Members of Congress would not do well to neglect
the reality that a strong constituent services operation is an important component of
running a congressional o ce. However, with this increase in contact, members now
have more opportunities to both succeed and fail. These successes or failures can
impact how constituents perceive and approve of their member of Congress. Rather
than simply looking at whether contact in and of itself translates into approval, the
varying nature of these contacts makes it reasonable to examine the relationship be-
tween approval and contact as a function of how satisfied constituents are with the
results of their communication with Congress.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the results of an ordered logit estimator predicting
the probability of member job approval. The model controls for contact satisfaction,
party congruence, age, gender, racial congruence, race (white/nonwhite), education,
attention to and interest in politics, party identification, representative’s party, and
ideological extremity. Member job approval was recoded from a 5-point scale to a
3-point (-1, 0, 1) variable. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present first di↵erences generated using
CLARIFY(Tomz, Wittenberg and King, 2003). The baseline that the first di↵erences
are calculated from is a Republican white male between the ages of 45 and 54 who
has some college education, is of the same race, gender, and party as his member
of Congress, has moderate interest in political a↵airs and identifies as a moderate
ideologically and believes his member of Congress is a Republican.
Examining the 2007 first di↵erences, moving from no contact to some form of
contact has a nearly equal e↵ect on the probability of approval in opposite directions,
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  SE z P> |z|
Contact Satisfaction 1.015 .035 29.06 0.000
Party Congruence 1.126 .022 5.89 0.000
Age .0213 .015 1.41 0.160
Gender -.022 .044 -0.49 0.622
Racial Congruence .124 .049 2.56 0.011
Race(white/nonwhite) -.110 .055 -2.02 0.044
Education .0342 .015 2.31 0.021
Political Interest/Attention -.010 .035 -.030 0.765
Ideological Extremity -.086 .030 -2.86 0.004
3-point Party ID -.124 .022 -3.82 0.000
Perceived Member Party .127 .022 5.89 0.000
N 8568
Pseudo R2 .0915
Log-likelihood -8508.4702
Table 3.3: Ordered Logit Estimates of Member Approval, 2007
  SE z P> |z|
Contact Satisfaction 1.712 .030 57.46 0.00
Party Congruence 2.338 .034 68,73 0.000
Age .036 .008 4.45 0.000
Gender -.174 .025 -6.90 0.000
Racial Congruence .154 .030 5.13 .0.000
Race(white/nonwhite) -.132 .031 -4.16 0.000
Education .022 .009 -2.44 0.014
Political Interest/Attention -.046 .020 -2.26 0.024
Ideological Extremity -.089 .018 -5.05 0.000
3-point Party ID -.142 .018 7.84 0.000
Perceived Member Party .207 .009 23.30 0.000
N 29042
Pseudo R2 .2006
Log-likelihood -24834.327
Table 3.4: Ordered Logit Estimates of Member Approval, 2008
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  SE Lower 95%CI Upper 95% CI
High School Diploma! 4-Year Degree .025 .010 .005 .47
No Contact ! Bad Contact -.229 .008 -.245 -.214
No Contact! Good Contact .237 .008 .223 .252
Di↵erent Party! Same Party .249 .012 .226 .273
Low interest! High interest -.006 .016 -.038 .027
Moderate Ideology!Strong Ideology -.042 .015 -.071 -.014
Baseline Probability of Approval .481 .017 .448 .511
Table 3.5: First Di↵erences: Probability of Approval, 2007
  SE Lower 95%CI Upper 95% CI
High School Diploma! 4-Year Degree -.014 .006 -.025 .0003
No Contact ! Bad Contact -.404 .006 -.415 -.392
No Contact! Good Contact .225 .007 .213 .239
Di↵erent Party! Same Party .517 .007 .504 .530
Low interest ! High interest -.018 .008 -.034 -.001
Moderate Ideology!Strong Ideology -.038 .008 -.054 -.024
Baseline Probability of Approval .705 .009 .686 .721
Table 3.6: First Di↵erences: Probability of Approval, 2008
with a bad contact leading to an approximately 23 percentage point drop in the prob-
ability of congressional job approval, and a good contact leading to a 24 percentage
point increase in the probability of congressional job approval. With a baseline proba-
bility of approval just under 50 percent, this type of contact could have a large impact
on whether an individual approves of their member of Congress and would therefore
support him or her in a subsequent election. The only other characteristic that shows
a similar e↵ect is party congruence, unsurprisingly. Moving from di↵erent parties to
the same party would indicate a 25 percentage point increase in the probability of job
approval; however, members of Congress cannot guarantee co-partisanship with every
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resident in their district, while they theoretically have some control over the quality
of experiences that their constituents might have in interacting with their o ces.
The 2008 data show a similar pattern to that of the 2007 data, with one notable
exception. Moving from no contact to a poor contact has a massive e↵ect on the
probability of job approval for the member of Congress, a 40 percentage point drop.
Moving from no contact to a positive contact only has about a 23 percentage point
e↵ect. Additionally, the e↵ect of co-partisanship in the 2008 data is very large, with
moving from di↵erent parties to the same party carrying a 51 percentage point di↵er-
ence, demonstrating the overwhelming e↵ect that partisanship has with regard to job
approval. This flies in the face of the conventional wisdom that members ought to
make themselves available to their constituents as much as possible in order to engage
in high-quality retail politics; contact is not always the useful advertising activity that
we may think it is. Rather, contact can function in less helpful ways and can have
a detrimental e↵ect on the probability of member job approval. Looking at the 2008
data, the potential detrimental e↵ect of a bad contact could be seen as encourage-
ment for members to limit their services or contacts to maximize the probability of
high-quality contact that will leave constituents satisfied.
Job approval is unsurprisingly dominated by party congruence. However, the
other characteristics have some surprising e↵ects. Another source of a large e↵ect on
the probability of approval comes in the form of interest in politics. Those who are
very interested in politics are about 12% less likely to approve of their member of
Congress than those with low interest in politics. This may be related to theories that
argue that Congress, as the most public branch of the government, is also the branch
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Figure 3.1: E↵ect of Contact Satisfaction on Approval, 2007
that citizens trust the least (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995). Likewise, higher levels
of education and strong ideologies—characteristics often thought to be useful to the
maintenance of a strong civic culture—also lead to lower probabilities of approval for
members of Congress.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the e↵ects of contact on the probability of member
job approval in 2007 and 2008, respectively. As is visible from the graph, the base-
line probability of approval of one’s member of Congress for someone who has not
contacted their member of Congress is just under .5 in 2007 and about .7 in 2008.
For those who have had good contacts, the probability of approval is over .7 in 2007
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Figure 3.2: E↵ect of Contact Satisfaction on Approval, 2008
and approximately .9 in 2008. Bad contacts drive that probability to less than .3
in the 2007 data and approximately .3 in the 2008 data. 4. Figures 4.3 and 4.4
present a demonstration of the power of contact’s e↵ect on approval in relation to
partisanship. Party congruence is the best predictor of member job approval and
is a di cult hurdle to overcome. However, as these figures show, the probability of
approval for a co-partisan with an unsatisfactory contact is actually lower than that
for a non-co-partisan who had a satisfactory contact with their member of Congress.
This could bode well for the value of constituent services in politically heterogeneous
districts.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Members of Congress are always trying to put their best foot forward. The per-
manent campaign is very real and is composed of both their activities in o ce and
all of the perks that o ceholding carries, as well as their campaign-specific activities
such as fundraising. The fact that good contacts with one’s constituents can increase
the probability of job approval comes as no surprise. However, the power of these
contacts in relation to something as durable as political partisanship does bear some
consideration. Partisanship is a relatively fixed identity in most cases and forms a
perceptual lens through which people evaluate information and assess political ac-
tions and figures. Those things that fit within the framework of that perceptual lens
are more likely to be accepted and approved of, while those that are outside those
barriers are less likely to make it through to incorporation in an individual’s political
Figure 3.3: Contact And Approval by Party, 2007
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Figure 3.4: Contact And Approval by Party, 2008
worldview.
This helps us understand how the e↵ect of contact can interact with political
partisanship so clearly. Receptivity is a clear element in developing understanding,
and for a person to contact a member of Congress or any other political figure would
indicate a certain amount of receptivity—they have asked for the information or the
help, after all. A satisfactory response in this case would certainly be helpful in terms
of bridging the gap between members of Congress and their constituents, particularly
when crossing party lines. Given the nature of primary challenges in the modern con-
text, particularly on the right, it may also be necessary to shore up one’s bona fides
outside of roll call votes in order to stave o↵ challenges due to partisan or ideological
65
purity tests.
Members of Congress are certainly granted significant resources in order to manage
their jobs as representatives of the people. O ce space in Washington and the dis-
trict, sta↵ salaries, communications budgets, relationships with the media and party
o cials, and funds to travel frequently to the district are all advantages granted to
members of Congress, and they are central to making sure that the member is able to
present him- or herself to their constituency e↵ectively. However, members are short
on one key resource: time. As campaigns grow more and more expensive, members
of Congress are obligated to spend an increasing proportion of their time both in
Washington and in the district raising funds for themselves as well as their party and
other members of Congress. Some evidence indicates that members are cognizant of
the increased demands placed on them by their constituents, with a distinct trend
toward keeping a larger sta↵ in one’s district rather than in Washington (Ornstein,
Mann and Malbin, 2008).
Members of Congress are also now subjected to their constituents having more
access to them simply by virtue of modern technological tools. Members of Congress
have noted the increased rancor of constituents, and being accessible to constituents
can come with a certain level of risk to one’s person, as the shooting of Rep. Gabrielle
Gi↵ords demonstrated in 2011. While many members leaving public o ce have cited
the increasing dysfunction within Congress as a reason behind their departure, oth-
ers have indicated that the demands and perceptions of their constituents have also
played a role, making it di cult both to serve as a representative and to legislate
e↵ectively (Allen, 2012; Grim and Siddiqui, 2013).
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As individual member resources are reoriented toward the nature of the permanent
campaign, the role and importance of sta↵ in the day-to-day workings of Congress
increases. However, despite the increasing volume of communications with Congress,
sta↵ levels have declined since 1979 and pay has also remained flat. Sta↵ are also
underpaid relative to comparable positions in the DC metro area, and sta↵ turnover
is relatively high; a study of sta↵ turnover between 2009 and 2011 placed the reten-
tion rate over a two-year period at under 65% (Dumain, 2012). Heavy workloads and
demanding constituencies aside, many congressional sta↵ take jobs as lobbyists, lever-
aging their connections and expertise about Congress. However, it is unlikely that
a lobbying firm would reward expertise in managing constituent communications. If
sta↵ers want to seek employment in the private sector, they are probably more likely
to develop skills and contacts to facilitate such a transition rather than emphasizing
constituent responsiveness. Though more members of Congress are stationing sta↵ in
district o ces, sta↵ incentives will remain an important component in understanding
congressional responses to their constituents.
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Chapter 4
Using the Franking Privilege: An
Exploration
4.1 Introduction
Every member of Congress has to figure out a way to keep in touch with her con-
stituents. For some, this means being a member of the “Tuesday-Thursday Club,”
spending as much time as possible at home in their districts. Other members of
Congress set up elaborate district operations with experienced caseworkers to help
constituents navigate the federal bureaucracy. In recent years, members of Congress
have turned to higher-tech tools, including websites, Twitter, and “Tele-TownHalls.”
The dramatic results of the “Congress on Your Corner” and town hall events held by
many members of Congress in the summer and fall of 2009 in order to facilitate dis-
cussion of the health care legislation under consideration were a clear demonstration
that many constituents want more contact with their member of Congress, sometimes
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to the detriment of the member’s public perception. Some members of Congress are
able to cultivate fruitful relationships with the media, though this presents problems
of its own.
At the end of the day, though, members of Congress must find e cient means of
communication that allow direct contact with as many constituents as possible, at the
lowest cost to the member in terms of time, energy, and finances, and this is where
the franking privilege comes into play. The franking privilege is a central perquisite
of holding o ce in the United States. In essence, it allows the signature of a member
of Congress to substitute for first-class postage on o cial mail sent to constituents.
Eligible mail includes responses to constituent inquiries, general newsletters, notices
about events, and government documents (Glassman, 2007). Members also use the
franking privilege to solicit constituent feedback via district surveys with tear-o↵ post-
cards. House members are issued a Member’s Representational Allowance, calculated
based on the number of addresses in the member’s district, as well as estimated sta↵
and o ce expenses. Subject to this financial constraint and laws and regulations
governing franked mail, members are not otherwise limited as to the total amount
they may spend on franked mail, including mass mailings.
Franked mail is divided into two classes, which are subject to di↵erent regula-
tions.1 Mailings consisting of fewer than 500 pieces are not subject to inspection by
the Franking Commission. However, any mailing consisting of more than 500 substan-
tially similar pieces, regardless of whether they are mailed at once or over time, must
be submitted to the Franking Commission to determine whether they are in com-
1While the franking privilege is more extensive than the mass mailing privilege, I will use the
terms “franking” and “mass mailings” interchangeably in this analysis.
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pliance with regulations governing mass mailings. No member may use the franking
privilege to send campaign materials or other items not in the public interest, such
as holiday greetings, and members of the House may not send unsolicited mass mail-
ings outside their district. House members are not allowed to send unsolicited mass
mailings less than 90 days prior to any primary or general election in which they are
a candidate. In addition to the signature of the member (in place of a stamp) on the
mailing, each mass mailing must include the statement, “This mailing was prepared
and mailed at taxpayer expense.” In FY2006, House franked mail costs were $30.7
million. A 1981 report indicated that the average American received approximately
two pieces of mail per year from Congress (Robinson, 1981). This represents a large
decrease over the last twenty years, as the House has instituted stricter spending
limits and public disclosure of mailing costs (Glassman, 2007).
While it is clear that citizens are happy to share their views in great volume with
members of Congress, their representatives also hold some responsibility for commu-
nicating the results of those views back to the district. Survey data has indicated
that what constituents want most from their representatives is to be kept informed
about what is going on in Washington (Michigan, 2002). However, while we assume
that members of Congress take as much from this well of institutional advantage as
they can, we know little about how this varies among members of Congress. Not
all members of Congress maximize their use of these perquisites, and some send no
mass mailings at all. Who makes the most use of it, and can this be predicted by
member or constituent charactaristics? This study is a step toward developing a new
understanding of the mechanisms of representation.
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The franking privilege, and mass mailings in particular, have many advantages for
the member. Many members now outsource the production and mailing of large-scale
newsletters, for example, cutting down on the amount of sta↵ time dedicated to the
preparation of these mailings. Newsletters allow members to communicate directly
with their constituents without a media filter. Members have complete control of
the contents of the newsletter and are able to accentuate the positive, highlighting
legislation and achievements in accordance with what will get the best results for
the member in the district. It makes sense then, that members would attempt to
maximize their use of this tool; yet there is a great deal of variation within the Con-
gressional membership as to the use of the frank.
This analysis is designed primarily as an exploration of the patterns of use of
the mass mailing privilege in Congress. The study examines mailing behavior in the
House as a whole, patterns among minority members of Congress and districts with
varying racial makeups, relationships between mailing patterns, seniority, and vote
share, and a brief examination of characteristics of the group of members of Congress
who sent no mass mailings in 2007 or 2008.
4.2 Prior Research
Prior research on the franking privilege is scant, and somewhat outdated. Most
research on the franking privilege and resource allocation in general occurred in the
1970s and 1980s, and more recent research covers only up through the year 2000
(Parker and Goodman, 2009). This creates a gap in our understanding of how mem-
bers of Congress use this privilege, as the regulations have changed dramatically in the
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last 30 years, as has the set of resources available to members of Congress. The Mem-
ber’s Representational Allowance was originally divided into separate accounts, while
it is now given as a lump sum that members may use in any way they choose. This
can provide a useful examination of how members choose to allocate their resources
and explain their Washington behavior, a crucial component of how we understand
the home styles of members of Congress (Fenno, 1978).
Most studies of the incumbency advantage have come to the conclusion that in-
cumbency provides an advantage of somewhere around 8%, and this advantage has
grown since the 1940s. Prior research has focused on explaining that there is in fact
an incumbency advantage, as well as some of the consequences of this advantage
(Gelman and King, 1990; King and Gelman, 1991; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997). Other
work has focused on the sources of the incumbency advantage: name recognition,
congressional casework, or use of the benefits of o ce and the creation of a “personal
vote” (Johannes and McAdams, 1981; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987; Romero,
2006). The findings with regard to how members of Congress can secure re-election
through the provision of constituency service, or casework (e.g. credit claiming) indi-
cate that citizens do respond positively to services provided by members of Congress,
though these findings are somewhat disputed (Fiorina, 1981; Johannes and McAdams,
1981; Serra and Cover, 1992; Serra and Moon, 1994). Evidence from state legislatures
indicates that higher legislative operating budgets tend to increase the incumbency
advantage (King, 1991). Survey evidence from Congressional o ces does little to
explain the characteristics of members who engage in a high level of constituency
service (Johannes, 1983).
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As far as advertising is concerned, experimental evidence indicates that mailings
without policy content can have a brief impact on levels of name recognition in a
member’s district (Cover, 1985, 1980). While this work has found e↵ects for perform-
ing casework and developing a “personal vote,” little work has been done about how
members of Congress actually go about claiming the incumbency advantage—who
pursues this advantage and in what ways—has been done, particularly in the mod-
ern Congress and particularly since the post-1995 changes in overall congressional
resource allocation. Some research does argue that short-term electoral factors do
not drive a large proportion of the member’s calculus in resource allocation (Bond,
1985). Likewise, the literature often depends on self-reports from member o ces
or aggregated data. Those members in districts with characteristics that favor the
member, regardless of what representational activities the member may engage in,
may not need to do much with the frank to have an incumbency advantage. Like-
wise, members in districts with some divisions, or districts that may be hostile to
the member in some way, may need to come out with guns blazing in communicating
with the district.
Congruence with one’s district may also play a role. Members of Congress who are
racial minorities and who represent districts with large minority populations may use
this privilege as a means to solidify their relationship with their constituents. This
may also help explain results about trust in government with regard to representation
by minorities in Congress (Mansbridge, 1999; Gay, 2002): These representatives are
working harder to achieve buy-in from citizens from traditionally less-active groups.
Likewise, those who are of a di↵erent race than a large proportion of their con-
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stituents may use the privilege more in order to overcome those divides, particularly
in districts where the representative is of a racial minority, but represents a non-
majority-minority district.
4.3 Data
The data presented here are drawn from the Statement of Disbursements of the
House, which is published quarterly by the Clerk of the House of Representatives.
Each quarter produces three volumes of data on the detailed expenditures for each
member of Congress, though there are no consistent reporting mechanisms. In the
third volume of each quarterly statement, the Clerk also publishes a summary of
members’ mass communication behavior. For 2007 and 2008, the data comes from
the hard copies of the statement. The assembled data from 2007 and 2008 includes
the number of pieces of mass mail sent, the average number of mailings per household
address, the total postage cost of these mailings, and the average postage cost per
household address. These figures include mailings sent only via traditional postal
means, and do not include any mailings or communications not sent in this format,
such as e-mail newsletters(Clerk of the House, 2007, 2008).2
The data are arranged by member, and each entry includes additional information
2The Committee on House Administration bean publishing PDFs of the Statement of Disburse-
ments of the House starting with the third quarter of 2009. Additionally, beginning with the 2009
legislative year, the information presented on mass communications changed from being focused
solely on traditional postal mail and expanded to include all mass communication of 500 substan-
tially similar pieces, regardless of form. This means that e-mail newsletters and scripts for telephone
town halls, which are popular among members of Congress, are now counted as part of members’
mass mailing reports.
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about the member and his or her district. The data compiled on each district includes
characteristics such as the district’s urbanicity and rural composition, the district’s
racial makeup, the percentage of the district population living below the poverty line,
the percent of the population over the age of 65, the district’s median income and the
total population in the district. The data were drawn from the American FactFinder
110th Congressional District Summary File as made available by the Census Bureau
(U.S. Census Bureau, N.d.). Additionally, for each member, the dataset includes
characteristics such as member gender, race, partisanship, and their vote share in
2006 (Koszczuk and Angle, 2007). These data were used to create a set of indicator
variables for having freshman status, being a “zero mailer,” representing a major-
ity minority district, and racial congruence for a majority minority district (e.g., an
African American member of Congress representing a majority African American dis-
trict). The data excludes members who did not serve a full calendar year as well as
non-voting delegates to Congress from Washington D.C. and other territories.
4.4 The Use of the Frank: The House as a Whole
Table 4.1 presents basic summary statistics about the use of the mass mailing
privilege for 2007 and 2008. Overall, the members in this dataset sent over 95 million
pieces of mail in 2007 and over 100 million pieces of mail in 2008. Even in an era
where one might think that traditional mailings may not be as useful, it is clear that
many members of Congress still lean very heavily on this tool. The average propor-
tion of the Member’s Representational Allowance (MRA) devoted towards postage
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2007 2008
Total Pieces Sent 96,269,202 101,393,010
Average Per Member 224,404 236,900
Total Postage Cost $19,811,473.73 $24,828,790.87
Average Postal Cost Per Member $46,180.59 $58,011.19
Average % of MRA 3.41 4.17
Number of Zero Mailers 75 82
Average Pieces per Person .347 .366
Table 4.1: Mass Mailings: Summary Statistics
costs is between 3%-4.5%, with some members spending over 20% of their MRA on
franked mail in 2008.
A number of findings here fit in with the conventional wisdom about the use of
such privileges; notably, there is a substantial uptick in all of the indictors from 2007
to 2008. This, of course, fits in with our understanding of how members behave in
election years. The increase in 2008 is even more surprising, given that members are
generally barred from sending unsolicited mass mail for 90 days prior to an election,
either primary or general, meaning that many members of Congress were sending
little mail during the final quarter of 2008. One surprising item is the increase in
the number of members not making use of the mass mailing privilege, from 75 to 82.
This may happen as some members discover that they will not face a challenge and
therefore opt to dial back their use of the privilege, while other members increase
the volume of their use of mass mailings as a tool to advertise their actions as an
incumbent member of Congress.
Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 provide data on the biggest mailers in the Congress,
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Name District Party Pieces
2007
Brown, H SC01 R 1,258,547
Obey WI07 D 995,962
Stark CA13 D 940,615
Pastor AZ04 D 931,661
Sensenbrenner WI05 R 849,651
2008
Brown, H FL03 D 1,338,982
Broun GA10 R 1,255,141
Dreier CA26 R 1,036,688
Bachmann MN06 R 1,025,383
Kuhl NY29 R 1,025,383
Table 4.2: Top 5 Mailers by Total Pieces
Name District Party Total Postage Cost
2007
Brown, H SC01 R $208,144.32
Obey WI07 D 135,914.34
Stark CA13 D 227,305.66
Pastor AZ04 D 185,935.10
Sensenbrenner WI05 R 134,482.62
2008
Culberson TX07 R $308,881.18
Brown, H SC01 D 296,729.77
Kuhl NY29 R 282,847.84
Dreier CA26 R 278,249.87
Murphy, T PA18 R 250,157.54
Table 4.3: Top 5 Mailers by Total Postage Cost
ranked by total pieces of mail, total postage spending, and percentage of MRA spent
on franked mail postage for mass mailings. In 2007, only one member of Congress,
Henry Brown of the South Carolina 1st, sent over 1 million pieces of mail, with the
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Name District Party % of MRA
2007
Gi↵ords AZ08 D 16.80
Stark CA13 D 16.06
Donnelly IN02 D 15.99
Brown, H SC01 R 14.91
Burton IN05 R 13.94
2008
Culberson TX07 R 21.55
Kuhl NY29 R 21.11
Brown, H SC01 D 20.70
Dreier CA26 R 19.03
Murphy, T PA18 R 17.59
Table 4.4: Top 5 Mailers by % of MRA
rest of the top 5 closer to 900,000. In 2008, all of the members in the top 5 sent
out over 1 million pieces of mail. Again, this hews closely to how we understand the
mechanisms of the frank; its use increases in election years. Given the populations
in these districts, this works out to about one newsletter per household for the first
three quarters of the year. Interestingly, the top 5 were not consistent from year to
year, both in terms of individual members and in terms of partisanship. The parti-
san breakdowns are interesting as well; in 2007 all of the categories were dominated
by Democrats, while the balance shifted toward Republicans in 2008. In all likeli-
hood, these shifts represent the member taking into account changing conditions on
the ground in their district into account, as well as the development of a legislative
record to announce back in the district.
The top 5 mailers in 2007 in each of the categories did not demonstrate much
with regard to a relationship between high relative use of the frank and electoral vul-
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nerability; the 2006 vote shares generally averaged in the range of 60%, which many
would consider a comfortable margin, with a high share of 74%. This may give us a
clue to the chicken-and-egg nature of thinking about the frank and electoral success:
These may be the results of a long-term use of the frank, as the average number of
terms in o ce for the 5 members sending the most mail in 2007 is more than 13.
However, the relationship between total spending and share of MRA appears to be
more closely tied to tenure; those demonstrate lower seniority on the average.
In 2008, the average 2006 vote share of the top 5 mailers increased substantially;
averaging over 65%, with several members unopposed in 2006 showing up in the top 5
for all three categories. This may indicate a more anticipatory use of the frank rather
than one responding to the prior signal of the most recent election. The member
unopposed in 2006 may find herself with a challenger two years later; the frank may
be a signal of how seriously the member takes this challenge.
4.5 Franking and Partisanship
The frank is beloved on both sides of the aisle, as demonstrated in Table 4.5. In a
non-election year, mass mailings go out at about even rates for both Democrats and
Republicans, with the GOP holding a slight edge. In 2008, both parties increased
their use of the frank, but the average Republican use of the frank increased much
more than the Democrats, with Republicans spending, on average, over $17,000 more
per member on mass mailings than in 2007. This could match up with increased
challenges in vulnerable GOP districts and a more robust dialogue as the national
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campaign ramps up, or members of the minority party may simply feel the need to
do more explaining of their actions in Congress or present themselves in a di↵erent
light. Members in the minority party may have a greater need to articulate a co-
herent partisan narrative with regard to a legislative agenda as they return home to
campaign, and so the franking privilege may play a larger role for minority party
members’ ability to explain their Washington work to their constituents.
Democrats Republicans
2007
Average Pieces 220,779 228,092
Average Postage Cost $45,647.59 $46,686.20
Average % of MRA 3.41 3.46
Zero Mailers 38 34
2008
Average Pieces 215,772 260,097
Average Postage Cost $52,641.46 $63,907.37
Average % of MRA 3.78 4.61
Zero Mailers 41 41
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics by Party
4.6 Franking and Demographics
An ongoing debate in the political science literature rests in the examination of de-
scriptive representation. An initial examination of how di↵erent demographic groups
approach the frank could give us insight into how members of Congress choose to
engage with their constituents.
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2007 White Black Hispanic
Average Pieces 229,884 130,339 253,904
Average Postage Cost $48,053.25 $21,129.14 $49,101.83
Average % of MRA 3.58 1.56 3.59
Zero Mailers 58 15 2
2008
Average Pieces 241,451 140,192 230,721
Average Postage Cost $59,548.43 $27,716.83 $66,542.05
Average % of MRA 4.28 1.97 4.75
Zero Mailers 68 13 1
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics by Member Race/Ethnicity
Race and ethnicity provide some surprising items and some clear variation. Most
noticeable is the much lower rate of usage appearing among Black members of Congress,
and the somewhat higher rate of usage of mass mailings among Hispanic-identified
members of Congress. Given this, some of the theories about descriptive representa-
tion (Mansbridge, 1999; Gay, 2002) may need more elaboration. If being represented
by someone of your own race if you are a member of a racial or ethnic minority
increases your rate of participation in government or communication with one’s rep-
resentatives, what is the mechanism of action? Mass mailings are certainly a crude
measure of this, but this provides some direction as to how we might examine varia-
tion in allocation of resources by members of Congress.
Table 4.6 presents summary statistics on use of mass mailings by member race or
ethnicity. It is clear from this table that White and Hispanic members of Congress lean
much more heavily on the mass mailing privilege than Black members of Congress.
On average, in both 2007 and 2008, both White and Hispanic members of Congress
sent over two hundred thousand pieces of mail under the mass mailing heading, with
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an average postage cost of just under $50,000 in 2007 and over $50,000 in 2008. This
uptick likely represents an expected increase in the use of the frank with the shift
from a non-election year to an election year. Notably, among White members of
Congress, the number of zero mailers increased from fifty-eight to sixty-eight from
2007 to 2008. This could potentially reflect a lack of challenger in the 2008 election,
lessening the need for a member of Congress to emphasize his or her record against
an opponent. Contrasting with White and Hispanic members of Congress, Black
members of Congress appear to be far less reliant on the mass mailing privilege. The
average Black member of Congress sent fewer than 150,000 pieces of mail in both
2007 and 2008. They tended to spend less than 2% of their MRA on mass mailings
in both 2007 and 2008. This could, in fact, reflect the fact that many Black members
of Congress represent very safe Democratic, majority minority districts and therefore
can re-orient their spending to sta↵ or o ce space as they have a strong sense of
trust with their constituencies, and perhaps they do not feel the imperative to use
this particular representational tool.
Table 4.7 examines the mass mailings sent to districts with particular demographic
characteristics. Majority Black districts received fewer than 100,000 pieces of mass
mail in 2007, on average, though the number of pieces of mail sent to majority Black
districts more than doubled in 2008. This in all likelihood reflects shifting electoral
landscapes as members realize that they have a challenger or that the political climate
of their district has somehow changed. Districts with a population that is majority
Hispanic did not display the same degree of change between the election year and the
non-election year. In 2007, majority Hispanic districts saw just under 200,000 pieces
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of mass mailings on average. In 2008, that increased to just over 260,000 pieces on
average. The proportion of the Member’s Representational Allowance spent on mass
mailings in 2007 was just under 3%, a proportion which increased only minimally, to
just under 5% in 2008. It would appear that the representational styles of members
of Congress representing Hispanic districts did not change appreciably between 2007
and 2008.
The relationship may not be driven by race or ethnicity; rather, this may sim-
ply be a function of the average tenure in o ce of Black and Hispanic members of
Congress. The average Black member of Congress in this study has been in o ce for
over 6 terms, with a range from freshman to 22 terms; the average Hispanic member
of Congress has also been in o ce for approximately 6 terms; however, the range is
much more compressed, with the longest tenure in the data at 13 terms.
In addition to the race of the member of Congress, it is also important to look at
the demographics of the districts being served, and the racial or ethnic congruence of
the majority with their member of Congress.
One longstanding reason for the creation of majority-minority districts is the abil-
ity of a population to elect a candidate of their choice, presumably of the same race of
the majority of the residents of the district. Virtually all districts that are majority-
minority do elect representatives from the demographic group in the majority of the
district. Table 4.8 examines the mailing behaviors in majority Black districts, bro-
ken down by whether the member of Congress elected by that district is African
American or not. In the 110th Congress, there was a single majority-black district
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2007 Majority Black Districts Majority Hispanic Districts
Average Pieces 79,547 194,571
Average Postage Cost $14,430.33 $38,427.30
Average % of MRA 1.08 2.80
Zero Mailers 16 9
2008
Average Pieces 160,198 262,875
Average Postage Cost $35,316.62 $64,002.35
Average % of MRA 2.63 4.62
Zero Mailers 8 2
Table 4.7: Mailing Activity, Majority Black and Majority Hispanic Districts
2007 Majority Black District, Majority Black District,
Black Representative Non-Black Representative
Average Pieces 79,449 386,595
Average Postage Cost $13,089.58 $91,163.98
Average % of MRA 0.97 7.02
Zero Mailers 11 0
2008
Average Pieces 88,129 655,717
Average Postage Cost $20,414.22 $175,610.80
Average % of MRA 1.48 13.15
Zero Mailers 8 0
Table 4.8: Mailing Activity, Majority Black Districts by Race of Representative
represented by a non-white representative, Democrat Steve Cohen (TN-9).The table
shows that the behavior of Black and non-Black representatives of majority Black
districts varies only in election years. In 2007, majority Black districts received an
average of just over 79,000 pieces of franked mail. Black representatives of majority
Black districts used an average of less than 1% of their MRA on mass mailings, and
eleven Black members of Congress representing majority Black districts sent no mass
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Majority Hispanic District, Majority Hispanic District,
2007 Hispanic Representative Non-Hispanic Representative
Average Pieces 257,437 123,339
Average Postage Cost $51,634.19 $23459.48
Average % of MRA 3.78 1.69
Zero Mailers 2 7
2008
Average Pieces 235,874 304603
Average Postage Cost $67,077.37 $59,250.06
Average % of MRA 4.80 4.34
Zero Mailers 1 1
Table 4.9: Mailing Activity, Majority Hispanic District by Ethnicity of Representative
mailings whatsoever. Cohen, the only non-Black representative of a majority Black
district, sent more than 300,000 pieces of franked mail to his district, spending more
than $90,000, or just over 7% of his Members’ Representational allowance.
The behavior of Black members of Congress representing majority Black districts
did not change appreciably between 2007 and 2008. The number of pieces of mail
sent on average to a majority Black district with a Black representative increased by
fewer than ten thousand pieces, on average, and the proportion of the MRA steered
toward mass mailings went up by about a half a percentage point. This behavior was
remarkably di↵erent in the case of Black majority districts represented by non-Black
members of Congress. In 2008, Cohen, who had dealt with a challenging election to
Congress in 2006, significantly increased his spending on franked mail. This is, in all
likelihood, one of the clearest electoral e↵ects that we could see in this case. Cohen
sent more than 650,000 pieces of mass mailings, spending over $175,000, or 13.15
percent of his members’ representational allowance. This is even more remarkable
because much of that mailing must be condensed into the first half of the year given
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the nature of House regulations on the use of the frank in the times surrounding
elections.
Table 4.9 examines the mailing activities in districts that are majority Hispanic,
broken out by the ethnicity of the member of Congress. In this case, a somewhat
di↵erent trend is visible than that in the case of Black majority districts. The average
Hispanic member of Congress with a Hispanic majority district sends more mail than
the average non-White representative for a majority Hispanic constituency. In 2007,
this led to an average of just over 250,000 pieces of mail sent by Hispanic members
of Congress to majority Hispanic districts. The case of non-Hispanic members of
Congress and their majority Hispanic constituencies is similar to that of non-African
American members of Congress who represent majority African American districts.
In 2007, the average member of Congress in this type of district sent just over 120,000
pieces of mass mailings to their district. In 2008, this average more than doubled,
to an average of over 300,000 pieces of mail and an average spend of almost $60,000.
Only one member of Congress for this type of district sent no mail whatsoever. This
may feed into di↵erential needs for members’ presentation of self (Fenno, 1978), par-
ticularly in more populated districts or districts with di cult-to-reach populations,
such as Hispanic populations where English may not be the primary language or there
is a large immigrant or non-citizen population that may not be civically involved or
is not eligible to participate in politics. Members of Congress many focus less of
their energy on constituents who do not vote or cannot vote. Hispanic members of
Congress who are racially congruent with the majority of their constituents may have
less of an incentive to use this type of communication, as they may be able to put
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more e↵ort into face-to-face forms of communication.
Additionally, there are members who represent plurality White, majority-minority
districts. These districts are particularly concentrated in California, where districts
may have large Asian, Hispanic, and Black populations as well as a significant white
population. In many cases, these members may be performing individual outreach to
leaders of these groups with mailings that are sub-500 pieces, which prevents us from
drawing significant conclusions about the overall behavior patterns of these represen-
tatives.
4.7 Electoral Factors
Classical examinations of the use of the frank (Lipinski, 2004; Cover, 1985) de-
note a clear relationship between one’s electoral position and one’s use of the franking
privilege, particularly mass mailings. While regulations are in place that could con-
ceivably cut back on this, the relationships still hold.
Table 4.10 presents results of a univariate OLS regression of 2006 vote share on
mass mailing behavior in 2007 and 2008. The relationship varies clearly between
the two, with the 2006 election having a clear negative relationship to the member’s
2006 vote share and a limited negative relationship between vote share and mail-
ing behavior in 2008. In all likelihood, this reflects reactions to the 2006 election;
a candidate elected from a marginal district may want to shore up his or her new
district quickly and solidify that relationship. Additionally, there was a change in
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2007   SE t t> |z|
2006 Vote Share -4471.481 756.330 -5.91 0.000
Constant 525140.8 51890.18 10.12 0.000
N 430
R2 0.0733
2008   SE t t> |z|
2006 Vote Share -3196.024 821.5363 -3.89 0.000
Constant 446832.6 56166.66 7.96 0.000
N 422
R2 0.0348
Table 4.10: Univariate OLS Regression Estimates of Mass Mailing Behavior, 2007
and 2008
party control in 2007; this relationship could also reflect new members of Congress
from more marginal districts boosting their name recognition in their new positions.
The explanatory power of the variable also decreases between 2007 and 2008; while
this relationship explains about 7% of the variation in 2007, it explains just about
3.5% of the variation in 2008.
It also makes sense to evaluate this relationship while controlling for other poten-
tial factors such as district and member demographics. Tables 4.11 and 4.12 present
this data for 2007 and 2008, respectively.
Tables 4.11 and 4.12 present the results of a multivariate regression of the total
pieces of mail sent by members of Congress, controlling for 2006 vote share, member
tenure, district percent urban, district percent Black, district median income in 1999,
district percentage in poverty, and the percentage of senior citizens in the district.
The model also includes indicator variables for majority Black and Hispanic districts
represented by Black and Hispanic members of Congress, whether the district qual-
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Variable   SE t t> |z|
2006 Vote Share -2456.562 1127.304 -2.18 0.030
Terms in O ce -2583.396 2678.171 -0.96 0.335
% Urban 1271.294 698.143 1.02 0.069
% Black 352.266 1181.188 0.30 0.766
1999 Median Income 0.6278 2.043 0.31 0.759
% in Poverty -3895.803 4041.037 -0.96 0.336
% over 65 1376.341 3799.083 0.36 0.717
Member Party 8067.314 24113.91 0.33 0.738
Majority Black Dist. with Black Rep -82795.44 66683.25 -1.24 0.215
Majority Hispanic Dist. with Hispanic Rep 94903.63 61328.58 1.55 0.123
Marginal District 9285.865 30001.4 0.31 0.757
Freshman 152135.2 39126.68 3.89 0.000
Constant 280931.3 153182.9 1.83 0.067
N 411
R2 0.1750
Table 4.11: Multivariate OLS regression estimates of mass mailing behavior, 2007
Variable   SE t t> |z|
2006 Vote Share 933.134 1120.847 0.83 0.406
Terms in O ce -5194.721 2824.496 -1.84 0.067
% Urban 1434.852 733.118 1.96 0.051
% Black 442.750 1250.307 0.35 0.723
%1999 Median Income 2.387 2.149 1.11 0.267
% in Poverty -2158.179 4242.621 -0.51 0.611
Member Party -64846.55 25016.51 -2.59 0.010
% over 65 4767.267 3999.45 1.19 0.234
Majority Black Dist. with Black Rep -129021.7 72330.33 -1.78 0.075
Majority Hispanic Dist. with Hispanic Rep 81460.39 64053.25 1.27 0.204
Marginal District 48654.28 36655.29 1.33 0.185
Freshman 189124.8 41175.68 4.59 0.000
Constant -45763.76 158031.7 -0.29 0.772
N 403
R2 0.1899
Table 4.12: Multivariate OLS Regression Estimates of Mass Mailing Behavior, 2008
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ifies as marginal, and whether the member is in his or her first term, as well as the
member’s partisanship.
Table 4.11 indicates that members’ mailing behavior does respond to the election
results in the prior election. There is a clear and significant negative relationship
between member vote share and the amount of mailings that a member of Congress
sends; as the member’s share of the vote increases, for each point increase, the num-
ber of mailings drops by over 2,000. Even controlling for district demographics and
member characteristics, this relationship stays strong. The only other characteris-
tic that approaches the explanatory power of vote share in 2006 is freshman status,
which is likely related to the share of the vote. First term members of Congress are
generally more vulnerable and are less well known in their districts, and they must
put a great deal of time and energy into shoring up their bona fides back home. This
analysis demonstrates that electoral success and time in the chamber both play a role
in explaining how members allocate their resources.
The 2008 results, presented in table 4.12, show a slightly di↵erent story. Mem-
ber and district characteristics play a much larger role in explaining the variation in
members’ use of the frank, rather than a clear relationship to prior electoral achieve-
ments. The relationship between vote share and member mailing behavior changes
in both sign and significance, with a positive relationship between vote share and
mailing behavior, but the relationship is much weaker. Rather, time in o ce, dis-
tract urbanicity and demographics, and freshman status are much more powerful in
explaining who is using the frank to communicate with constituents. Members who
have been in o ce longer send over 5,000 fewer pieces of mail for each term in o ce.
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Another factor in less usage of the frank is member party; Democrats are less likely
to send mail than Republicans:Tthis could indicate members’ perceptions of electoral
vulnerability in the context of the 2008 election season. Freshman status continued
to display a strong positive relationship to the use of the frank, with members in their
first term continuing to make a much heavier use of the frank than those with more
tenure in o ce.
Figure 4.1: Spending vs 2006 Vote Share, 2007
Examining total spending on postage plotted against the member’s 2006 vote
share, or their most recent signal of their electoral strength, there are some noticeable
idiosyncrasies, as is visible in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. One item of note is the high level of
variation in the use of mass mailings by members who were unopposed in 2006. While
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Figure 4.2: Spending vs 2006 Vote Share, 2008
there is certainly endogeneity to be taken into account when examining how members
of Congress respond to the various factors in their district, it is interesting that there
isn’t a clearer relationship. Some things are as expected: the set of members sending
the highest number of mailings is heavily weighted toward those receiving smaller
vote shares; the spending on the frank decreases somewhat as the 2006 vote share
increases. The relationship is certainly not one-to-one, but it does make sense. One
interesting item to note is where the zero mailers show up along the spectrum. In
2007, there are very few zero mailers with vote shares under 55 percent. In 2008,
the zero mailers are somewhat more present in that region. Future research could
include whether the member had an announced challenger in the 2008 race, which
may explain some of the changes from 2007 to 2008.
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Figure 4.3: Total Mail Pieces Sent vs. Terms in O ce, 2007
The examination of seniority and the use of the frank presents some interesting
questions. The first is in the realm of examining the cohort e↵ects of entry into
Congress, and the second is derived from questions of expansionist vs. protectionist
career phases.
It is conceivable that many new members of Congress enter the chamber with large
e-mail lists and a somewhat sophisticated online communications operation (Burden,
2007). In a sense, this could lead to a drop in the number of pieces of mail sent by
members in their first few terms, as they lean on their prior resources. However, this
does not appear to be the case. In 2008, at least, every member in the first term
sent out some sort of mass mailing. This may be a function of the expansionist phase
of the members’ careers, indicating that they are looking to bolster their re-election
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Figure 4.4: Total Mail Pieces Sent vs. Terms in O ce, 2008
coalition, while they may see less need to do so in the first year of their term (Fenno,
1978)
While one might think of those holding o ce for a long time as set in their ways,
it appears that they don’t spend much money on the franking privilege, as can be
seen in Figures 4.3 and 4.4. They may be relatively confident in their incumbency
advantage, secure in their perception at home, with a larger proportion of their budget
spent on district o ces, higher sta↵ salaries given the likely seniority of their sta↵,
and travel back to the district, though recent studies note that more senior members
tend to focus their energies on legislative productivity (Parker and Goodman, 2009).
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4.8 No Newsletters? A Brief Examination of “Zero
Mailers”
A common consideration in examining the behavior of members of Congress is that
members are single-minded seekers of re-election, and they are resource maximizers
(Mayhew, 1974). Given this, and the fact that the frank is one of the best-known
assets of o ceholders, a sizeable proportion of the house opts to send no mailings
under the mass mailing privilege. This indicates that they have no occasion to send
500 or more pieces of substantially similar mail, a somewhat surprising concept given
that the average district population is over 300,000.
As the MRA is zero-sum, there is no “use it or lose it” imperative specific to any
component of the allowance. A dollar not spent on franked mail is an additional
dollar to be spent on sta↵ or travel, though the hiring and salary rates for congres-
sional sta↵ are somewhat circumscribed. A member cannot, for example, put forth
the entirety of his or her allowance to employing thirty sta↵ers; members are limited
to 22 sta↵ total, both full and part-time. Other than that, however, members are free
to do as they wish. So why opt out of an extremely convenient means of contacting
large populations? Future research could examine the overall spending patterns of
these members in greater detail; but for now, an examination of the demographic
characteristics of these members is in order.
Seventy-five members of Congress in 2007 sent no mass mailings, and in 2008 that
number went up to 82. The overall makeup of this population reflects, in large part,
the demographics of the Congress as a whole: mostly white, and mostly male. The
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2007 population of zero mailers was generally sent to o ce by large margins in 2006,
averaging 73% of the vote, with a range from 57% to 100% (unopposed). They were
generally longer-tenured members, averaging over 8 terms in the House, and from
largely urban areas, perhaps where members can more e ciently use district o ces
or media to reach out to their constituents. The 2008 zero mailers largely reflect the
same characteristics; however, the range of 2006 vote shares increases slightly, with
members receiving between 49% (in a multi-way election) and 100% of the vote in
2006 opting out of sending mass mailings.
There are several possible explanations for these members’ behavior. The most
nefarious is that these members are sending out mass mailings but failing to report
them; this is unlikely, as members do have to account for their spending rates to the
Committee on House Administration. Some of these members may be from farther-
flung districts and may leap at the opportunity to spend more of their allowance on
travel, rather than being restricted to a certain number of trips per year, as it was
under the former system. There may also be a communications format substitution
e↵ect; members opting out of this tool may have large, sophisticated Internet oper-
ations, or take advantage of large well-managed e-mail lists. Nevertheless, the mere
presence of this population warrants further study.
4.9 Conclusion
This analysis presents several key findings about the use of the franking privi-
lege in the House of Representatives. While most members of Congress do opt to
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communicate with their constituents on a broad basis with this resource, there is
a significant minority that opt out entirely. Racially congruent representatives of
majority-minority districts, both Black and Hispanic, are somewhat less likely to use
the franking privilege, likely reflecting their overall general electoral security. Prior
electoral results are somewhat predictive of future use of the frank, but initial results
indicate that anticipation of future electoral challenges may be a more accurate pre-
dictor of whether a member opts to use the mass mailing privilege. Members early
in their tenure in the House, particularly freshmen members, are particularly likely
to take advantage of the mass mailing privilege, reflecting the requirements of the
expansionist phase of a congressional career.
This is a preliminary investigation, and further data collection must be under-
taken to more broadly understand the mechanisms governing the use of the franking
privilege in this context, as well as some assessment of the content of these mailings.
The variation by race of member and district racial composition provides some inter-
esting new information about how the mechanisms of descriptive representation may
operate in the modern context, with Black members of the House using the mass
mailing privilege at a far lower rate than other members of the House, and members
representing majority Black districts sending far fewer of these mailings regardless of
the member’s race, except in election years.
The franking privilege, and mass mailings in particular, is the subject of a great
deal of scrutiny. Bills have been introduced in multiple Congresses that would ban
members from mass mailings of congratulatory notices and newsletters and would
disclose on the mailing the cost involved in producing and sending these items (Glass-
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man, 2007). This legislation has rarely made it past committee, though members of
both parties have filed legislation on this topic. With the greater availability of MRA
and mass mailing data starting in 2009, it is possible that increased public awareness
of this spending may lead to better prospects for this legislation and further changes
to the current regulatory structure.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Members of Congress do not have an easy job. With the increasing demands
placed on their time by fundraising, constituent services, legislation, the news media
and political parties, they are required to manage their priorities in ways that their
predecessors could not have imagined. How these representatives respond to these
demands has clear consequences for our understanding of how democracy works in a
practical sense.
It is clear that more constituents are getting in touch with their representatives.
This is reasonable, given the twin factors of increased population growth and the ease
of communications today. While much lower rates of communication were reported in
studies through the 1990s than in the CCES, this can be attributed to the increased
ease of communication made possible by advances in online technology. However,
there is certainly more to be done in this area. Constituents now have more opportu-
nities not only to communicate with their members of Congress through direct means,
but also to express dissatisfaction publicly. For example, constituents could air their
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grievances with their poor experiences with their representatives through channels
such as Facebook or Twitter, which could then have a ripple e↵ect through social
networks. Future research could investigate whether those who contacted their rep-
resentatives told any friends, colleagues, or family members about their experiences
communicating with Congress, either positively or negatively.
Additionally, examining whether contacts are independently directed, solicited by
members of Congress, or orchestrated by an interest group or other organization could
provide more insight into how these contacts originate. Prior research has shown that
political involvement is often developed through a recruitment process, which could
help researchers better understand the factors that motivate communication (Verba,
Schlozman and Brady, 1995). Additionally, congressional sta↵ question the veracity
of the mass mailings orchestrated by interest groups; some policy proposals have en-
couraged o ces to develop stronger indexing metrics by which congressional o ces
could track policy interest from the district (Fitch and Goldschmidt, 2005). Ask-
ing those who contact their members of Congress about how their communication
originated could provide insight into how constituents view these communications–do
they weight them heavily? Do they rely on scripts or talking points provided by an
outside group? Such information would also inform a broader understanding of how
political participation works today.
This research is also somewhat time-bound; an increase in communications via
third-party services was not as much a part of the communications landscape at the
time of these surveys. The vast majority of members of Congress do use third-party
tools such as Twitter and Facebook, and these tools can serve as a means by which
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members and their sta↵ solicit communications from their constituents. However,
these communications are not necessarily of the same depth as traditional commu-
nications methods. What does it mean, for example, if a constituent “Likes” a post
by a member of Congress? Is that the same as forwarding an e-mail from an interest
group? How do member o ces manage these types of communications, particularly
given that the ability of an o ce to determine whether or not such communications
are originating from within the district? Members may relish the back-and-forth that
such tools are able to create, and may also be able to use these tools to send trial
balloons about potential policy ideas out into the ether. However, these tools, and
their direct access to constituents, can provide opportunities for members of Congress
to, for lack of a better term, make fools of themselves when mis-using the tools.
Additionally, generational replacement may a↵ect how members of Congress choose
to interact with their constituents. As those who have been raised on a steady diet of
internet access from a young age become old enough to run for and hold o ce, they
will naturally bring a di↵erent sensibility with regard to communications to their job.
Now, securing one’s name—and any potential variations—for a web domain, e-mail
address, and Twitter handle is a necessary step to take if a person remotely considers
a life in the public eye. As this generation moves into public o ce, the twin demands
of communication and transparency may radically alter the way that representatives
and constituents relate to one another. It may no longer be necessary for a con-
stituent to go to the e↵ort of seeking out sta↵ through e-mail or the phone; some
public o cials now respond directly and quickly to requests made via Twitter, which
is both shorter in form and highly public. While this tends to be used more at the
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municipal level, as in the case of Newark, New Jersey mayor Cory Booker, if these
individuals move into higher o ce they may take this sensibility with them. However,
this sensibility could shift the expectations of constituents to an unreasonable and
unsustainable level.
While the old maxim holds that “to be known is to be liked”, members used to
enjoy far more control over their own public image, as well as more distance through
making their residence in the Washington area. Nowadays, with many members of
Congress spending as little time in Washington as possible and maximizing days in
their home districts, members are far more accessible. While at first glance this could
be seen as a boon, giving members even more opportunities for voters to get to know
them, it also opens up opportunities to let constituents down. As noted in Essay 2,
poor contact satisfaction can even drop the probability of approval for co-partisans,
which would seem to be virtually impossible, given what we know about congres-
sional approval. However, there are now more opportunities to fail when engaging
with constituents, and members would do well to manage expectations, train sta↵
well, and use discretion in communications.
There is also the lack of geographic constriction inherent in the use of some of
these electronic tools. Some members of Congress require those contacting them to
provide address information, and reject communications from constituents not in the
district. Others use a template that allows anyone to contact them, but may well en-
gage some sort of filtration mechanism at the o ce level. At the very least, members
must do much more to separate wheat from cha↵. While there was never anything
preventing non-constituents from initiating contact with members of Congress, the
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e↵ort involved in making a phone call or writing a letter provides a disincentive to
do so, making it easier for members of Congress to negotiate the volume of mail they
get. Members must now devote their limited resources to an additional level of triage;
members want to avoid wasting resources on a non-voter, but at the same time, miss-
ing an important request or communication could have negative consequences later
on. With some of the lower-cost tools, members could use these means to raise their
own profile outside the district, managing their public image in anticipation of ad-
vancement to higher o ce or within the chamber or party. Members of Congress
using these tools can simultaneously reach many more constituents, but also more
individuals outside the district, for better or for worse.
After recent campaigns, many members of Congress come into o ce with strong
digital operations and less dependency on television advertising and direct mail. In
all likelihood, there are cohort and age e↵ects to be examined, with more recent fresh-
man classes displaying more digital savvy, with veteran lawmakers tending towards
older mechanisms. Di↵erential data reporting could be helpful in this area; starting
with the third quarter of 2009, the Statements of Disbursements of the House began
including e-mail newsletters, which are subject to regulation by the Franking Com-
mission, in their mass mailing counts. This clearly gives a more accurate picture of
the communications choices being made by members of Congress. However, think-
ing about this as a function of resource allocation becomes more di cult. The new
data do not distinguish between electronic and paper newsletters , so any members
combining print and digital newsletters would have the true allocation of their o ce
resources somewhat more obscured.
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From a policy point of view, members must negotiate a labyrinthine web of reg-
ulations that have not necessarily kept up with the times. The franking manual
issued by the Committee on House Administration is 66 pages long, but has not been
updated since 1998. It includes no information about electronic newsletters or third-
party websites such as Facebook and Twitter. Until 2008, members of Congress were
barred from posting information on sites other than the o cial House and Senate
websites, though many members used services such as Twitter and YouTube prior
to the issuance of regulations allowing this. As the communications environment
continues to shift into even smaller spheres such as tablets and mobile phones, the
way that constituents make contact with those who represent them will continue to
evolve. The question is whether public policy and law makers will manage to keep
up with these forthcoming changes.
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